Too Many to Fail: Against Community Bank Deregulation by Kress, Jeremy C & Turk, Matthew C
Copyright  2020  by  Jeremy C. Kress & Matthew C. Turk Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  115,  No.  3 
647 
Articles 
TOO MANY TO FAIL: AGAINST COMMUNITY 
BANK DEREGULATION 
Jeremy C. Kress & Matthew C. Turk 
ABSTRACT—Since the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers and scholars 
have fixated on the problem of “too-big-to-fail” banks. This fixation, 
however, overlooks the historically dominant pattern in banking crises: the 
contemporaneous failure of many small institutions. We call this blind spot 
the “too-many-to-fail” problem and document how its neglect has skewed 
the past decade of financial regulation. In particular, we argue that, for so-
called community banks, there has been a pronounced and unjustifiable shift 
toward deregulation, culminating in sweeping regulatory rollbacks in the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 
2018. 
As this Article demonstrates, this deregulatory trend rests on three 
myths. First, that community banks do not contribute to systemic risk and 
were not central to the 2008 crisis. Second, that the Dodd-Frank Act imposed 
regulatory burdens that threaten the survival of the community bank sector. 
And third, that community banks cannot remain viable without special 
subsidies or regulatory advantages. While these claims have gained near-
universal acceptance among legal scholars and policymakers, none of them 
withstands scrutiny. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, community banks 
were key participants in the 2008 crisis, were not uniquely burdened by 
postcrisis reforms, and continue to thrive economically. 
Dispelling these myths about the community bank sector leads to the 
conclusion that diligent oversight of community banks is necessary to 
preserve financial stability. Accordingly, this Article recommends a reversal 
of the community bank deregulatory trend and proposes affirmative reforms, 
including enhanced supervision and macroprudential stress tests, that would 
help mitigate systemic risks in the community bank sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If there was one consensus following the 2008 financial crisis, it was 
that “too-big-to-fail” banks were to blame for the market crash.1 
Commentators and policymakers lambasted Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, 
AIG, Goldman Sachs, and other perceived culprits for misconduct and 
 
 1 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, at xviii (2011) (“We conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk 
management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis.”). 
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excessive risk-taking.2 As a result, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and other postcrisis regulatory 
reforms cracked down on the biggest banks to prevent them from cratering 
the economy again.3 
This shared understanding of the 2008 crash as a too-big-to-fail crisis 
reflected an equally broad assumption: that small banks were not the 
problem. So-called community banks were perceived to be innocent 
bystanders, overrun by market turmoil caused by much larger financial 
institutions.4 Policymakers and legal scholars alike presumed that 
community banks—which were far removed from Wall Street’s financial 
engineering—could not be the source of systemic risk.5 
Community banks have long been sympathetic figures in financial 
regulatory circles. Generally speaking, community banks are deposit-taking 
institutions with less than $10 billion in assets that focus on traditional 
financial products like commercial real estate, home mortgage, small 
business, and agriculture loans.6 Reasoning that such firms pose little risk, 
 
 2 One columnist famously called Goldman Sachs “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of 
humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” Matt Taibbi, The 
Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 2010, 7:58 PM), https://www.rollingstone 
.com/politics/politics-news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-195229/ [https://perma.cc/QKS7-
T5UG]. 
 3 The preamble to Dodd-Frank states that it is “[a]n Act . . . to end ‘too big to fail.’” Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1376 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Michelle Fox, Most Banks Were Victims of 2008 Crisis: Kovacevich, CNBC (Sept. 15, 
2014, 5:21 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/most-banks-were-victims-of-2008-crisis-
kovacevich.html [https://perma.cc/76WT-X69X] (“The 7,000 mainstream banks did not have any serious 
problems. They didn’t do the bad things. They were victims of the crisis that occurred because of the 20 
perpetrators[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wells Fargo chief executive officer Richard 
Kovacevich)). 
 5 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 40 (2017) [hereinafter TREASURY BANKING REPORT], 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KY5S-TS8B] (“[C]ommunity banks . . . do not present risks to the financial 
system . . . .”); see also Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks After Dodd-
Frank, 90 IND. L.J. 179, 184 (2015) (“[C]ommunity banks did not cause the 2008 financial crisis.”). 
 6 The term “community bank” has been used as both a colloquial label for small banks in general and 
as a more technical legal term of art. Historically, regulators considered a depository institution to be a 
community bank if it had less than $1 billion in assets. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: COMMUNITY BANK SUPERVISION 1 (2010) (“Community 
banks are generally defined as banks with less than $1 billion in total assets . . . .”). More recently, 
however, regulators increased this threshold to $10 billion. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: COMMUNITY BANK SUPERVISION 1 (2018) (“Generally, banks 
with assets of $10 billion or less are characterized as community banks.”). For research purposes, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) adopts a more nuanced view, treating a depository 
institution as a community bank if it has less than $10 billion in assets, engages in traditional banking 
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policymakers have frequently granted community banks special regulatory 
treatment.7 By the late 2010s, however, many observers concluded that 
Dodd-Frank had inadvertently handicapped community banks, burdening 
them with unwarranted legal requirements and compliance costs.8 Across the 
political spectrum, policymakers agreed that community banks needed relief 
from Dodd-Frank in order to remain competitive.9 
This dominant narrative has now culminated in sweeping deregulation 
of the community bank sector. In 2018, Congress passed the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA) with 
bipartisan support.10 The EGRRCPA and related rollbacks by the federal 
banking agencies eased capital requirements, loosened liquidity rules, and 
relaxed supervisory oversight of community banks.11 The largest community 
bank trade association celebrated these reforms for providing “relief from 
excessive and unnecessary regulatory burdens.”12 Regulators likewise agreed 
 
activities, and operates in a limited geography. See FDIC, COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, at 1-1 to -3 
(2012) [hereinafter FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY]. Most scholars agree that the essential 
characteristics of a community bank are small asset size, a simple balance sheet, and limited geographic 
scope. See, e.g., Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 3–4 (Harvard 
Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper No. 37, 2015), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/Final_State_and_Fate_Lux_ 
Greene.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T35-3QEZ]. 
 7 For example, under the Federal Reserve’s Small Bank Holding Company and Savings and Loan 
Holding Company Policy Statement, community bank holding companies are exempt from certain 
regulatory capital requirements. See 12 C.F.R. § 225, app. C (2017). 
 8 See, e.g., Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, Opinion, Dodd-Frank Is Hurting Community Banks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:20 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/14/has-dodd-frank-
eliminated-the-dangers-in-the-banking-system/dodd-frank-is-hurting-community-banks 
[https://perma.cc/D8VY-RSCH]; Rob Nichols, Yes, Community Banks Are Struggling Under Dodd-
Frank, POLITICO (Sept. 6, 2016, 3:18 PM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/09/community-
banks-dodd-frank-000197 [https://perma.cc/9GAJ-HZSW]. 
 9 See Scott Heitkamp, Opinion, Political Foes Agree: Small Banks Pounded by Dodd-Frank, HILL 
(June 27, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/339693-helping-small-banks-
is-something-we-can-all-agree-on [https://perma.cc/J52P-HFXY]. 
 10 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA), Pub. L. No. 
115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018); see also Aaron Klein, Bipartisanship in Banking Is Back, BROOKINGS 
(Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/bipartisanship-in-banking-is-back/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UT22-WADE] (noting that the EGRRCPA was supported by “a group of moderate Democrats 
[and] most[,] if not all[,] Republicans”). 
 11 See infra Part III. 
 12 Press Release, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., ICBA Supports Senate Community Bank Regulatory 
Relief Agreement (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.icba.org/news/news-details-results/2017/11/13/ICBA-
Supports-Senate-Community-Bank-Regulatory-Relief-Agreement [https://perma.cc/T9RP-FL55]. 
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that the EGRRCPA would help small banks “meet the financial service needs 
of their consumers and businesses.”13 
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that led to this 
comprehensive deregulation. It is the first legal scholarship to scrutinize the 
widely accepted justifications for easing regulatory burdens on community 
banks.14 As the Article demonstrates, the leading rationales for rolling back 
community bank safeguards are each deeply flawed. 
First, contrary to popular belief, community banks can propagate 
systemic risk. When community banks fail, they do not collapse in isolation. 
Rather, community banks tend to fail en masse due to their highly correlated 
balance sheets and funding strategies.15 And when many community banks 
fail simultaneously, small businesses, homeowners, and local communities 
lose access to needed financial services, further damaging the economy.16 
This dynamic, which we call the “too-many-to-fail” problem, has occurred 
in every banking crisis in U.S. history, up to and including the 2008 crash.17 
Second, Dodd-Frank and other post-financial crisis reforms did not 
uniquely burden community banks. To the contrary, policymakers exempted 
community banks from the most significant Dodd-Frank rules.18 While some 
“one-size-fits-all” postcrisis rules do apply to community banks, regulators 
minimized the burden on smaller firms by setting easily achievable standards 
and publishing special compliance guides. Moreover, several provisions in 
Dodd-Frank introduced generous subsidies for community banks that more 
than offset compliance costs attributable to the most onerous postcrisis 
rules.19 Thus, the consensus view that postcrisis reforms unduly burdened 
community banks is seriously mistaken. 
 
 13 Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller of the Currency Lauds 
Progress Toward Meaningful Regulatory Reform (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-145.html [https://perma.cc/457T-DWRR]. 
 14 One outlier that takes a similar approach is work by Professor Heidi Mandanis Schooner, who has 
questioned the popular notion of community bank deregulation. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, 
Regulating Angels, 50 GA. L. REV. 143, 160–61 (2015). Although Schooner advocates for strong 
community bank oversight, her essay does not squarely rebut common arguments for community bank 
regulatory relief. Separately, an excellent student note has disputed the view that community banks face 
unnecessary compliance costs. See Merric R. Kaufman, Note, Too Small to Succeed?: An Analysis of the 
Minimal Undue Regulatory Burdens Facing Community Banks in the Post Dodd-Frank Regulatory 
Environment, and How to Further Minimize Their Burdens, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 445, 458–68 
(2018) (arguing that compliance costs associated with Dodd-Frank did not themselves cause the decline 
of community banks). 
 15 See infra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 16 See infra Section I.D. 
 17 See infra Sections I.A, I.C. 
 18 See infra Section II.A.1. 
 19 See infra Section II.A.2. 
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Third, community banks do not require regulatory relief to compete 
with larger financial institutions. In fact, community banks’ market share has 
increased since the financial crisis, and they remain just as profitable as they 
were before Dodd-Frank.20 Proponents of regulatory relief point to a sharp 
drop in the number of community banks as evidence that Dodd-Frank 
disproportionately impaired smaller firms, but this too is misleading. On 
closer examination, the steady decline in the number of community banks 
predates Dodd-Frank and is more attributable to macroeconomic conditions 
following the crisis than to excessive regulatory burdens.21 The economic 
case for community bank regulatory relief, therefore, has been vastly 
overstated. 
Despite the limited legal and empirical support for deregulation, these 
pervasive myths about community banks have gained acceptance not only in 
policymaking circles, but also in legal scholarship. Of the handful of 
financial regulatory scholars who have written about community banks, all 
have endorsed the popular narrative that postcrisis regulation unfairly 
penalized smaller firms and should be relaxed.22 Professor Tanya Marsh, for 
example, asserts that Dodd-Frank “puts community banks at a competitive 
disadvantage as compared with their larger, more complex competitors.”23 
Even Professor Arthur Wilmarth—typically a proponent of strong financial 
regulation—has advocated for easing safeguards on community banks.24 
 
 20 See infra Section II.B. 
 21 In many cases, the smallest depository institutions have outgrown the community bank 
designation, while few investors have formed new community banks due to persistently low interest rates. 
See infra Section II.A.1. 
 22 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 216–24 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s impact on community banks); Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed to Preserve the Viability of Community 
Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 282–88 (2015) (asserting that 
Dodd-Frank imposes a heavy compliance burden on community banks); see also Bryce W. Newell, The 
Centralization of the Banking Industry: Dodd-Frank’s Impact on Community Banks and the Need for 
Both Regulatory Relief and an Overhaul of the Current Framework, 15 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 15–
16 (2016) (surveying evidence of community banks’ compliance costs post-Dodd-Frank); Gregory Butz, 
Comment, Treating Apples Like Oranges: The Benefit of Exempting Community Banks from the Volcker 
Rule, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 453, 465–67 (2019) (discussing the Volcker Rule’s effect on community 
banks); Alan J. Wilson, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: Regulating Away the Community Bank—
An Analysis of the Costs of Current Regulations on Community Banks, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 463, 480–85 
(2013) (contending that Dodd-Frank increases the regulatory burden on community banks). Even 
Professor Schooner, who supports strong prudential regulation of community banks, concedes that 
community bank regulatory relief proposals “are worthy of serious and careful consideration.” Schooner, 
supra note 14, at 158–59.  
 23 Marsh, supra note 5, at 179. 
 24 Professor Wilmarth opposed provisions in the EGRRCPA that deregulated mid-size banks. See 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Raising SIFI Threshold to $250B Ignores Lessons of Past Crises, AM. BANKER 
(Feb. 7, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/raising-sifi-threshold-to-250b-
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Thus, legal experts generally support community bank regulatory rollbacks 
along the lines of the EGRRCPA. 
By contrast, this Article argues that the EGRRCPA’s community bank 
deregulation will increase systemic risk in the banking sector. As a result of 
recent regulatory rollbacks, community banks are more likely to invest in 
riskier assets and rely on more volatile sources of funding.25 Excessive risk-
taking, meanwhile, will escape supervisory scrutiny because the EGRRCPA 
curtails regulatory reporting and oversight for these same institutions.26 
Furthermore, new rules will allow hedge fund and private equity investors to 
exert greater control over community banks’ corporate governance, leading 
to even more risk-taking.27 In combination, therefore, these reforms are likely 
to increase the fragility of the community bank sector and intensify the too-
many-to-fail problem. 
A longer-term result of the EGRRCPA will be that riskier financial 
activities migrate to smaller banks over time as market participants engage 
in regulatory arbitrage. This conclusion follows from basic economic and 
financial theory, which predicts that risk-taking tends to shift from well-
regulated to less-regulated sectors.28 Consistent with the logic of regulatory 
arbitrage, early evidence suggests that community banks have already begun 
to absorb a greater share of financial risk as a consequence of Dodd-Frank’s 
emphasis on regulating the too-big-to-fail megabanks.29 The EGRRCPA will 
accelerate this pattern of regulatory arbitrage, as community banks will no 
longer face risk-based capital requirements, annual supervisory 
examinations, or limits on volatile funding. Thus, while the consequences of 
the EGRRCPA might not materialize immediately, this sweeping 
community bank deregulation will ultimately hasten the next too-many-to-
fail crisis. 
As a response, this Article recommends three policies to combat the 
looming too-many-to-fail problem. First, policymakers should repeal the 
EGRRCPA and related deregulatory initiatives. Second, the financial 
 
ignores-lessons-of-past-crises [https://perma.cc/7WGD-9DC6]. Wilmarth, however, has enthusiastically 
endorsed community bank regulatory relief. See Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 339–42. 
 25 See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
 26 See infra Section III.C. 
 27 See infra Section III.D 
 28 For a seminal academic treatment of regulatory arbitrage, see generally Victor Fleischer, 
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010). 
 29 See, e.g., Kristle Cortés, Yuliya Demyanyk, Lei Li, Elena Loutskina & Philip E. Strahan, Stress 
Tests and Small Business Lending 30–34 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 18-02, 2018) 
(finding that the market for risky small-business loans has shifted from megabanks to community banks 
in response to Dodd-Frank stress tests). 
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regulatory agencies should use their microprudential supervisory authority 
to closely scrutinize community banks near the $10 billion asset threshold—
a highly salient regulatory “cliff” where many postcrisis legal restrictions go 
into effect. Given the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, risks are likely to 
“bunch” in banks just below the $10 billion threshold, and supervisors should 
target their oversight accordingly.30 Third, the federal banking agencies 
should perform periodic, sector-wide stress tests of community banks as part 
of their macroprudential efforts coordinated through Dodd-Frank’s Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).31 Unlike Dodd-Frank’s institution-
specific stress tests for too-big-to-fail banks, sector-wide stress tests would 
assess the health of the community bank industry as a whole and attempt to 
identify any common vulnerabilities. Collectively, these reforms would 
restore strength to the community bank sector and help alleviate the too-
many-to-fail problem. 
To be clear, our objective is not to stifle community banks with 
excessive regulation. Instead, these recommendations aim to preserve the 
long-term viability of the community bank sector. Community banks provide 
critical financial products and services that too-big-to-fail banks do not.32 
Unlike big banks, which usually rely on standardized mathematical models 
when underwriting loans, community banks specialize in “relational” 
lending—using their familiarity with local customers to extend loans to 
creditworthy but nontraditional borrowers that rigid underwriting models 
would not support.33 For this reason, community banks are critical to long-
term economic growth. Our aim, therefore, is to better align the regulation 
of this profitable, yet highly cyclical sector with the goal of maximizing 
lending throughout the business cycle, rather than just in the near term. 
The discussion below proceeds as follows. Part I describes the too-
many-to-fail phenomenon—its theoretical basis, historical evidence, and 
underappreciated significance. Part II then critiques the prevailing narrative 
of excessive community bank regulation. It shows that community banks do 
not need regulatory relief because Dodd-Frank largely spared smaller firms 
and, in any event, community banks have flourished since the financial crisis. 
Part III analyzes the EGRRCPA and related deregulatory initiatives, 
 
 30 See infra Section I.B; cf. Vladimir Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, The Impact of the Durbin 
Amendment on Banks, Merchants, and Consumers 25–27 (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2046/ [https://perma.cc/2K32-YZPZ] 
(documenting “bunching,” or strategic manipulation, of bank-asset sizes around regulatory thresholds). 
 31 See infra Section I.C. 
 32 For example, despite controlling only 14% of banking-industry assets, community banks held 46% 
of small loans to farms and businesses in 2011. See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 6, 
at I. 
 33 See id. at 1-1. 
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detailing how these misguided regulatory rollbacks will undermine the 
stability of the community bank sector. Finally, Part IV proposes a path 
forward, suggesting that policymakers should safeguard the financial system 
by reversing the community bank deregulatory trend and appropriately 
supervising risks in smaller banks. The Article concludes that such reforms 
are necessary to mitigate the long-overlooked too-many-to-fail problem. 
I. THE TOO-MANY-TO-FAIL PROBLEM 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers and scholars have focused 
on solving the too-big-to-fail problem. To date, however, few have 
acknowledged an equally serious issue: the simultaneous collapse of 
numerous small institutions. This Part explains why the too-many-to-fail 
problem has been the dominant source of systemic risk in U.S. banking 
history. Section I.A details the role that small banks have played in all 
previous U.S. banking crises prior to the 2008 crash. Section I.B outlines the 
theoretical basis for the “too-many-to-fail” phenomenon, by exploring the 
economic dynamics that cause small banks to propagate financial instability. 
Section I.C then uses those historical and theoretical analyses to reassess 
community banks’ central but overlooked role in the 2008 crisis. Finally, 
Section I.D documents the broad economic damage that occurs when many 
small banks collapse at the same time. 
A. “Too-Many-to-Fail” Throughout History 
The fixation on “too-big-to-fail” banks that followed the 2008 financial 
crisis is understandable in light of the dramatic, headline-grabbing collapse 
of those institutions. This narrow concern with megabanks, however, 
threatens to distort U.S. regulatory policy because it obscures one salient 
fact: every banking crisis in the United States prior to 2008 consisted 
exclusively of the simultaneous failure of many small banks. 
The too-many-to-fail phenomenon has thus been a staple of the U.S. 
banking sector since the founding of the republic. The nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when banks were uniformly small, was not an era of 
financial stability, to say the least.34 Among the economically crippling 
 
 34 See CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 183 (2014) (describing nineteenth-century U.S. banking as a 
“uniquely unstable system”); GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE 
DON’T SEE THEM COMING 33–38 (2012); RICHARD S. GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT: THE 
EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800, at 73 (2010) (“[T]he United States 
[from 1870 to World War I] was characterized by many small, unbranched banks as well as by frequent 
banking crises.”). 
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banking crises from this time are the “panics” of 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 
1893, and 1907.35 And that is only a partial list.36 This trend of frequent, 
systemic collapses reached new heights during the Great Depression. 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to ease the financial panic by 
declaring a nationwide bank holiday on his first day in office proved to no 
avail.37 Roughly 6,000 banks collapsed in 1933, with a total of 9,000 banks 
failing by the end of the decade.38 
After exiting the Great Depression, the financial system entered what 
has become referred to as its “quiet period,” when conditions remained 
relatively stable from the 1950s through the 1970s.39 That changed, however, 
with the 1980s savings and loan (S&L) crisis, which became the second most 
costly banking collapse in American history behind only the Great 
Depression.40 It, too, involved only small financial institutions. All told, 
1,300 firms known as “thrifts” and 3,000 traditional banks failed, at a cost of 
$360 billion to the federal agencies responsible for their resolution.41 
An obvious caveat to this narrative is that from the Founding to the 
1970s, the U.S. financial sector was highly fragmented, to the point that few 
big banks existed. Yet, by the time of the S&L crisis in the 1980s, that was 
no longer the case. Large, globally active banks began to emerge in the early 
1970s.42 And as soon as large banks appeared, some failed. The first major 
institution to collapse was Franklin National Bank in 1974.43 In 1984, the 
term “too big to fail” was coined to describe the downfall of Continental 
 
 35 See GORTON, supra note 34, at 9–24; CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, 
PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 110–12, 131 (5th ed. 2005); GROSSMAN, supra 
note 34, at 74. 
 36 Lesser “panics,” as mass runs on the banking system are often called, also occurred in 1814, 1825, 
1841, 1861, 1864, 1884, 1890, and 1914. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME 
IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 389–91, app. 4 (2009).  
 37 See GROSSMAN, supra note 34, at 246. 
 38 See id. at 245–46; CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 34, at 189. 
 39 See GORTON, supra note 34, at 125–33 (discussing the 1950–1970s quiet period). 
 40 See GROSSMAN, supra note 34, at 269–73 (discussing the S&L crisis). 
 41 See id. at 272. 
 42 See BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DOLLAR AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 49–66 (2011) (detailing the shift from a gold-
backed system to the growth of international currencies in the 1960s and ’70s); REINHART & ROGOFF, 
supra note 36, at 206; Beth A. Simmons, The Internationalization of Capital, in CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 36, 44 (Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks & John D. 
Stephens eds., 1999) (describing the internationalization of capital markets in the 1970s). 
 43 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 35, at 267–69; Sam Frizell, Could a 40-Year-Old Bank 
Collapse Have Saved the U.S. Economy?, TIME (Oct. 8, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/3479314/ 
franklin-national-bank/ [https://perma.cc/P6VQ-6BDK].  
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Illinois Bank—at the time, the largest bank failure in U.S. history.44 Then, in 
1998, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) failed in 
shocking fashion, forcing a final-hour rescue orchestrated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.45 
A common feature of the Franklin National, Continental Illinois, and 
LTCM episodes was that, despite a few weeks of localized panic and 
disruption, the consequences for the broader U.S. financial system and 
economy were negligible.46 In other words, even as putatively too-big-to-fail 
institutions were forming and failing, “too-many-to-fail” was the only 
systemic risk that actually materialized from the 1970s to 2008. In sum, even 
as the U.S. financial sector came to be dominated by diversified financial 
conglomerates, the too-many-to-fail problem persisted as the primary risk to 
the financial system. 
B. The Theoretical Basis for “Too-Many-to-Fail” 
The recurrence of the “too-many-to-fail” problem throughout U.S. 
history is unsurprising because it has a strong basis in economic theory. 
There are three reasons why, still today, community banks are at least as 
fragile as their larger counterparts. Small banks are especially susceptible to 
concurrent failures because they have: (1) highly correlated balance sheets, 
(2) similar funding vulnerabilities, and (3) runnable equity investments. 
First, many community bank asset portfolios are relatively 
undiversified and highly correlated with one another. Small banks typically 
specialize in niche lending markets—such as commercial real estate, small 
business, and agricultural loans—which are susceptible to similar economic 
risks. Larger banks, by contrast, are better able to scale their operations to 
include multiple lines of businesses, at least some of which are unrelated and 
therefore exposed to different macroeconomic shocks.47 This heterogeneity, 
 
 44 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 35, at 98, 219–21, 267–69; Lee Davison, Continental 
Illinois and “Too Big to Fail,” in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, at 235, 235–36 (1997).  
 45 See Tyler Cowen, Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/economy/28view.html [https://perma.cc/PB7S-5WQG] 
(discussing the Federal Reserve’s rescue of LTCM). See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS 
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (documenting the history 
of Long-Term Capital Management). 
 46 See GORTON, supra note 34, at 9 (stating that the crisis threatened by Continental Illinois “was 
never observed”). 
 47 See, e.g., Peter S. Rose, Diversification of the Banking Firm, 24 FIN. REV. 251, 251 (1989) 
(“Diversification of banks and bank holding companies into nonbank product lines may reduce the risk 
to banking returns or cash flows provided appropriate portfolio conditions are satisfied.”); William K. 
Templeton & Jacobus T. Severiens, The Effect of Nonbank Diversification on Bank Holding Company 
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at least in theory, makes individual financial conglomerates, and the large 
bank sector as a whole, more resilient to economic shocks.48 The community 
bank sector, on the other hand, can easily be wiped out by economic declines 
that disproportionately affect certain lending markets, because many small 
banks share similar financial vulnerabilities. 
Second, lack of asset diversification among small banks exacerbates the 
risk of runs on their liabilities. Because banks rely on deposits or other forms 
of short-term debt, they are prone to funding runs whenever creditors have 
an inkling that the bank’s stability may be compromised.49 When assets are 
less diversified—as in the community bank sector—these creditor panics are 
more likely. Moreover, since small bank portfolios often look alike, runs can 
spread rapidly across those institutions due to an “information contagion” 
process.50 Once accountholders in Kansas, for example, hear of bank panics 
in Ohio and Nebraska, they may rightly believe that the safest course is to 
withdraw deposits as quickly as possible and ask questions later. There are 
subtle limits to what federal deposit insurance can do to constrain this 
dynamic.51 Community banks, in sum, are both uniquely susceptible to 
deposit runs and particularly likely to transmit such distress to other small 
banks. 
 
Risk, 31 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 3, 9 (1992); THE CLEARING HOUSE, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF 
LARGE BANKS 36 (2011) (describing the benefit of large financial institutions in reducing exposure to 
individual asset classes); see also Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An 
Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1411 (2011) (noting that 
“[l]imiting banks’ activities could make banks more risky by reducing their ability to diversify their 
activities”). 
 48 See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 34, at 201–02; see also supra note 47. 
 49 See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (providing the canonical formal model of bank runs, which 
famously implies that even a stable bank may be subject to a run). 
 50 See Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information Contagion and Bank Herding, 40 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 215, 218–21 (2008) (providing a theoretical model of information 
contagion). See generally Charles Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski & David C. Wheelock, Interbank 
Connections, Contagion and Bank Distress in the Great Depression (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 
Working Paper No. 2019-001D, 2019), https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2019-001 [https:// 
perma.cc/BFM9-7Y54] (discussing information contagion during the Great Depression). 
 51 Bank deposits have been insured by the federal government since the Depression-era reforms of 
1933. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933). That guarantee, 
however, has always been subject to a statutory cap. Since Dodd-Frank, FDIC insurance has covered 
deposits of up to $250,000 per customer, per bank. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1540 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)). It is therefore commonplace for 
businesses or high-net-worth individuals to have larger deposits that are uninsured. Even in the Great 
Depression, most bank runs were triggered by these groups. See Jonathan D. Rose, Old-Fashioned 
Deposit Runs 19–23 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working 
Paper No. 2015-111, 2015). The reason is that larger depositors are usually more sophisticated and have 
greater incentives to monitor a bank’s stability. See id. at 24–25.  
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Finally, community banks are vulnerable to runs by not only their 
creditors but also their equity-holders. Community banks are often small 
enough to be owned by only a handful of controlling shareholders. When a 
bank experiences distress, these shareholders may strategically withdraw 
their investments by declaring special dividends or other capital 
distributions—the functional equivalent of a “run” on equity.52 By 
withdrawing their equity, community bank investors deplete the bank’s 
capital cushion and leave it even more vulnerable to depreciating asset 
values. When this process is repeated across many small banks that are 
experiencing distress simultaneously, runs on equity intensify weaknesses in 
the community bank sector. 
In sum, economic theory provides a straightforward explanation for the 
United States’ recurrent financial crises: small banks are fragile, and when 
they collapse, they often do so en masse. The theoretical basis of the too-
many-to-fail phenomenon lies in the unique vulnerability of each component 
of community bank balance sheets—assets, debt, and equity. In light of this 
theoretical grounding, the historical pattern of financial crises in the United 
States cannot be dismissed as anomalous or outdated trivia. Rather, it is a 
reminder that the too-many-to-fail problem remains a pressing issue for 
modern financial regulation. 
C. The Too-Many-to-Fail Crisis of 2008–2013 
Policymakers’ recent neglect of the too-many-to-fail problem is not 
merely a product of historical or theoretical myopia. It also rests on a deeply 
flawed understanding of the 2008 financial crisis. After the crash, 
conventional wisdom coalesced around the view that the crisis exclusively 
involved the big Wall Street banks.53 Yet, the factual record makes clear that 
the collapse of the too-big-to-fail banks was accompanied by a separate, 
large-scale crisis that swept across small U.S. banks from 2008 to 2013. 
After the smoke cleared, that initial misconception was never corrected, and 
the too-many-to-fail crisis of 2008 to 2013 has since languished in obscurity. 
The oft-overlooked too-many-to-fail crisis that accompanied the Great 
Recession was historic in magnitude. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) authoritative account of small-bank performance cites 
 
 52 See, e.g., Christopher Henderson, William W. Lang & William E. Jackson III, Insider Bank Runs: 
Community Bank Fragility and the Financial Crisis of 2007, at 2–8 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working 
Paper No. 15-09, 2015). 
 53 See, e.g., TREASURY BANKING REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (describing the need to reduce the 
regulatory burden on community banks “in light of the complexity and lack of systemic risk of such 
financial institutions”). 
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eye-opening figures.54 From March 2008 to year-end 2009, the number of 
distressed banks rose from 90 to 700.55 By 2011, it had peaked at 884, or 12% 
of all federally insured depository institutions.56 For the 2008 to 2013 period 
as a whole, 489 banks failed and were resolved by the federal government.57 
Of those failures, all but nine were community banks.58 
Moreover, the too-many-to-fail crisis of 2008 to 2013 exhibited strong 
parallels with both the theoretical intuition and historical record discussed 
above. The 884 banks that the FDIC declared distressed were not 
destabilized for 884 different reasons. Rather, they succumbed to a familiar 
pattern that reflects the underlying dynamics of small banks as a source of 
systemic risk. Like all preceding too-many-to-fail crises, community banks 
were wiped out due to a perfect storm of: (1) underdiversified asset portfolios 
and fragile funding models, which were (2) highly correlated across 
institutions nationwide, and therefore (3) exposed the community bank 
sector as a whole to a common macroeconomic shock.59 
As in previous crises, the 2008 to 2013 too-many-to-fail crisis coincided 
with a sharp depreciation in community banks’ unique asset portfolios. The 
biggest predictor of a small bank’s failure during this time was its exposure 
to commercial real estate loans and multifamily mortgages—the same mix 
of assets that destabilized S&L institutions in the 1980s.60 Meanwhile, small 
banks with relatively large investments in the toxic assets that undermined 
the Wall Street banks—namely, single-family mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities—were more likely to remain stable.61 
The story for the liability side of small-bank balance sheets was familiar 
as well. Conventional wisdom holds that, since its introduction in the 1930s, 
 
 54 FDIC, CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013 (2017) [hereinafter FDIC REPORT]. 
 55 Id. at xiv. 
 56 Id. at 119. 
 57 Id. at xxxii, 119. 
 58 Id. at 114–15. 
 59 See, e.g., Mark H. Kawa & Steven VanBever, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Community 
Banks: A Conference Summary, CHI. FED LETTER, Mar. 2010 (describing the origins of the 2008–2013 
too-many-to-fail crisis). 
 60 See Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. White, Déjà Vu All over Again: The Causes of U.S Commercial 
Bank Failures This Time Around, 42 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 5, 6, 14–15, 26 (2012) (noting the parallel 
findings from studies of bank failures from the 1985–1992 period); see also Rebel Cole & Jeffery W. 
Gunther, Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems, 13 J. FIN. 
SERVS. RSCH. 103, 106 (1998) (analyzing the sources of S&L failures); James B. Thomson, Modeling the 
Bank Regulator’s Closure Option: A Two-Step Logit Regression Approach, 6 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 5, 14–
17 (1992) (same). 
 61 See Cole & White, supra note 60, at 6, 26. 
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federal deposit insurance has protected small banks from runs by creditors.62 
But as Federal Reserve research has shown, “old-fashioned deposit runs” 
became widespread during 2008.63 Depositors, spooked by the losses 
community banks experienced on their asset portfolios, rushed to withdraw 
from their accounts, which in turn forced many community banks to engage 
in emergency “fire sales” of their assets.64 Indeed, the damage from those 
bank runs was so significant that the FDIC launched the Transaction Account 
Guarantee Program (TAGP) in October 2008, effectively guaranteeing every 
deposit of every bank in the United States.65 Traditional run dynamics were 
therefore a key contributor to the small-bank crisis of 2008. 
Finally, community banks also experienced runs on their equity in 
2008. During the lead-up to the crisis, when community banks’ controlling 
shareholders saw the writing on the wall, there was a race to strip equity 
through the issuance of special dividends and other capital distributions.66 
Runs on equity were most severe at community banks in the weakest 
condition.67 And, predictably, once the equity cushions at these small banks 
were depleted, they became even more exposed to the collapse of their asset 
portfolios.68 
Taken together, these dynamics support a striking conclusion: although 
small-bank failures during the financial crisis lagged slightly behind the 
collapse of large financial institutions, which peaked with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers and AIG in September 2008, the too-many-to-fail crisis 
was not merely a byproduct of the too-big-to-fail crisis or the sharp economic 
downturn that followed. Indeed, the assets that proved toxic for the too-big-
to-fail banks and the too-many-to-fail banks were different.69 Likewise, the 
 
 62 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW & POLICY 249 (2d ed. 2018) (“Bank runs have remained virtually nonexistent in the 
United States since the 1930s . . . .”). 
 63 See Rose, supra note 51, at 8–9 (discussing deposit outflows from small banks); see also 
Christopher Martin, Manju Puri & Alexander Ufier, Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The 
Role of Deposit Insurance 10–17 (FDIC, Working Paper No. 2018-02, 2018) (examining how the 
presence of deposit insurance affected shifts in bank deposits); cf. Hyun Song Shin, Reflections on 
Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON PERSPS. 101, 107–
15 (2009) (describing the run on U.K. bank Northern Rock in late 2007). 
 64 A special type of deposit—known as a brokered deposit—experienced especially swift 
withdrawals. See infra note 232 and accompanying text; infra Section III.B. 
 65 The TAGP was part of a broader Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which the FDIC rolled 
out at the time. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at xiii, xvii–xviii. 
 66 See Henderson et al., supra note 52, at 13–17. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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run-risks these banks faced were different. Small banks experienced runs by 
large depositors and concentrated shareholders, while the run on large banks 
was triggered by an unrelated group of creditors in the “shadow banking” 
sector.70 In addition, small banks were generally unscathed by the 
counterparty defaults and asset fire sales that led to a domino effect of 
distress at large, interconnected banks. Although Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy petition led to AIG’s failure the next day, no small banks were 
directly intertwined with either of those institutions or with their other Wall 
Street peers.71 It is not the case, therefore, that community banks were 
collateral “victims” of the too-big-to-fail crisis of 2008. 
Instead, the community bank crisis was caused by a dramatic slowdown 
in the commercial real estate and construction industries, a development that 
had already reached historic proportions by 2007.72 The downturn in those 
sectors was so extreme that it would have put many community banks under, 
regardless of the health of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, or the 
shadow banking system that supported them.73 In other words, even if the 
 
 70 The shadow banking sector is usually considered to consist of repurchase agreements, asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits, and money market mutual funds. See generally Daniel Covitz, Nellie Liang 
& Gustavo A. Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Market, 68 J. FIN. 815 (2013) (explaining asset-backed commercial paper programs and runs by 
investors); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating 
Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 313 (discussing money market funds and 
their role in the financial crisis); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on 
Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012) (explaining repurchase agreements and their drive in securitized-
banking runs). 
 71 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 943, 979 (2009) 
(detailing the relationship between the falls of Lehman Brothers and AIG). With regard to fire sales, large 
banks were primarily dumping mortgage-backed securities and related instruments, which were not held 
in substantial amounts by small banks and were not correlated with the failures of small banks that did 
hold them in substantial amounts. See Cole & White, supra note 60, at 12–13 (“The loan portfolio 
variables indicate that failed banks had significantly higher concentrations of Construction & 
Development loans and significantly lower concentrations of Residential Single-Family Mortgages and 
Consumer Loans.”); Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 
25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29, 38–41 (2011) (discussing fire sales during the financial crisis). 
 72 See generally STEVEN D. GJERSTAD & VERNON L. SMITH, RETHINKING HOUSING BUBBLES: THE 
ROLE OF HOUSEHOLD AND BANK BALANCE SHEETS IN MODELING ECONOMIC CYCLES (2014) (examining 
the crash in residential and commercial construction that preceded the financial crisis); see also Adam J. 
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 94, 104–
07 (2013) (analyzing the precrisis property bubble with a focus on commercial real estate). 
 73 The relevant timeline is detailed in a critical book-length treatment of the financial crisis by Steven 
Gjerstad and Vernon Smith. As they note, sales of new home units had already collapsed by the end of 
2005. By mid-2006, construction of single and multifamily homes, primarily financed by small banks, 
fell off precipitously as well. See GJERSTAD & SMITH, supra note 72, at 53–56. Nominal consumer credit 
outstanding fell 7% in both 2008 and 2009. The only other postwar years that saw declines were 1975 
(1%) and 1991 (1.9%). See id. at 82. 
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too-big-to-fail crisis had never occurred, the recessionary pressures that 
gained momentum before 2008 would likely have still produced a systemic 
collapse of the community bank sector between 2008 and 2013.74 Moreover, 
in a counterfactual case where the too-many-to-fail crisis occurred in 
isolation, the scale of small-bank failures would have been comparable in its 
severity,75 rivaling the 1980s S&L crisis and thereby ranking as at least the 
third-largest banking crisis in modern American history.76 
D. The Economic Costs of the Too-Many-to-Fail Problem 
A complete accounting of the too-many-to-fail problem must go 
beyond the sheer number of banks that failed or experienced distress during 
a financial crisis. From a policy perspective, the operative issue is not how 
many banks failed, but at what cost to society. It is well known that damage 
from the Depression-era bank failures was catastrophic and that the 1980s 
S&L crisis imposed remarkable costs as well. The ramifications of the 
community bank crisis of 2008 to 2013, however, are much less discussed. 
This Section examines the broader economic costs of too-many-to-fail crises, 
with a focus on the most recent collapse. 
A conservative estimate of the direct costs of community bank failures 
between 2008 and 2013 puts the immediate damage at nearly $50 billion. 
According to the FDIC, more than $47 billion in federal funds was spent in 
 
 74 A possible objection on this point is that the recession itself was due to the rise of securitization 
and other innovations at the too-big-to-fail banks during the 1990s and 2000s. While those practices no 
doubt played a role, it is equally true that they are neither necessary nor sufficient for a recessionary 
housing bubble. The Great Depression and the S&L crisis both featured large shocks to housing markets, 
in a world where large banks, low-documentation “liar loan” mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and 
credit default swaps did not exist. In fact, eleven of the past fourteen recessions in the United States have 
been preceded by sharp downturns in housing construction and prices. See id. at 10. 
 75 Another reason to place less weight on peculiarities of the U.S. home-finance regime is that the 
coinciding bubble-and-bust cycle in American housing prices was by no means an outlier internationally. 
Equal or greater fluctuations occurred in most European countries, including Ireland, Spain, Belgium, 
and France. See Paul Hilbers, Alexander W. Hoffmaister, Angana Banerji & Haiyan Shi, House Price 
Developments in Europe: A Comparison 12–13 (IMF Working Paper WP/08/211, 2008) (placing the rise 
in U.S. housing prices from 2005–2007 at the mid-range of European housing price fluctuations). Nor is 
the United States an outlier among advanced economies in terms of the rising ratio between private credit 
accumulation (through mortgages or otherwise) and economic output between 1950 and 2010, which 
increased at roughly the same rate during those six decades in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 
See Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Macrofinancial History and the New Business 
Cycle Facts 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22743, 2016). 
 76 Cf. FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at 203 (comparing the magnitude of bank failures from 2008–
2013 to that of the S&L crisis). 
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the process of resolving the 480 community banks that failed.77 As a result, 
the federal Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) incurred the steepest loss in its 
over-eighty-year history.78 An additional $1.5 billion in direct costs were 
imposed by distressed or failing banks that relied on the TAGP backstop.79 
While the federal government ultimately made a profit on its bailouts of Wall 
Street banks, that was not the case for the emergency funding assistance that 
it provided to community banks.80 
These direct costs, however, are dwarfed by the indirect costs of 
community bank failures. That is because small banks, which specialize in 
relational lending, provide critical financial products and services that larger 
banks do not.81 As Ben Bernanke famously wrote in his academic research 
before becoming Federal Reserve Chairman, when small banks across the 
country crumbled en masse during the Great Depression, many individuals 
and firms were cut off from the supply of credit that was necessary for 
normal levels of economic activity.82 The same thing happened beginning in 
2008. The failure of 480 community banks and the distress of 900 more 
restricted the supply of financial intermediation to small businesses and 
entrepreneurs that fuel the real economy in normal times.83 Critically, since 
 
 77 The cost of resolving all 489 banks that failed between 2008 and 2013 was $72.5 billion. See id. at 
181–82. The 480 failed community banks accounted for 65%, or $47.1 billion, of that total. See id. at 
114–15. 
 78 The DIF dropped from an all-time high surplus of $52.8 billion in March of 2008 to an all-time 
low of negative $20.9 billion by year-end 2009. Id. at xiv. For a historical timeline of federal deposit 
insurance, see Historical Timeline, FDIC (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/about/ 
history/timeline/1930s.html [https://perma.cc/AG9V-QBV6].  
 79 FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at 58. 
 80 The U.S. Treasury made a profit on the emergency loans it extended to Wall Street banks through 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). See Chris Isidore, U.S. Ends TARP with $15.3 Billion Profit, 
CNN BUS. (Dec. 19, 2014, 11:27 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/12/19/news/companies/ 
government-bailouts-end/ [https://perma.cc/5QRZ-W37M]. With respect to TAGP, however, the FDIC 
absorbed net losses of $300 million. FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at 58. Ironically, therefore, the FDIC’s 
assistance of community banks reflects an exercise in fiscal profligacy compared to that of the 
government’s too-big-to-fail bailouts. 
 81 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 82 See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 264–65 (1983); Ben S. Bernanke, The Macroeconomics of the Great 
Depression: A Comparative Approach, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1, 16–25 (1995). While 
Bernanke’s claim was considered novel at the time, it has since become a standard view among financial 
historians and economists. See GROSSMAN, supra note 34, at 246 & n.24 (citing to the related literature); 
see also GJERSTAD & SMITH, supra note 72, at 117–18 (discussing the influence of Bernanke’s 
interpretation of the Great Depression); Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Factors in the Great 
Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSPS. 61, 70–73 (1993) (same). 
 83 See Benjamin R. Mandel & Joe Seydl, Credit Conditions and Economic Growth: Recent Evidence 
from US Banks, 147 ECON. LETTERS 63, 64–67 (2016) (detailing the negative loan supply growth 
following the Great Recession, compared to the quicker recovery of demand); cf. Yuying Jin, Mingjin 
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community banks serve a unique niche, larger financial institutions were 
unable to fill the gap in credit provision that materialized when community 
banks pulled back on issuing new loans.84 The resulting contraction of credit 
stalled the exit from the Great Recession, which is often considered among 
the weaker economic recoveries in modern U.S. history.85 Thus, the total 
economic damage attributable to the too-many-to-fail crisis of 2008 to 2013 
extends far beyond the direct monetary costs.86 
In addition to impairing the economic recovery from the Great 
Recession, the too-many-to-fail crisis imposed another long-term cost: it 
exacerbated the moral hazard problem that has always loomed over banking 
regulation. Moral hazard refers to an incentive that insured parties have to 
increase their exposure to risks when the downside costs of those risks are 
borne by the insurer.87 Federal deposit insurance is the most direct source of 
the moral hazard problem for banks, but it appears indirectly as well to the 
extent banks receive ad hoc government bailouts.88 Not surprisingly, in light 
of this moral hazard dynamic, cross-country studies by scholars of 
comparative financial regulation tend to find a strong association between 
 
Luo & Chao Wan, Financial Constraints, Macro-Financing Environment and Post-Crisis Recovery of 
Firms, 55 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 54, 60–66 (2018) (analyzing the recovery of firms after the global 
financial crisis and noting that low recovery of firms, particularly those with limited access to external 
financing during the postcrisis credit crunch, slowed recovery at a macro level).  
 84 See Steven G. Craig & Pauline Hardee, The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Small Business 
Credit Availability, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1237, 1248–59 (2007) (finding that banking consolidation 
results in small businesses having less access to credit); Stacy Mitchell, Understanding the Small Business 
Credit Crunch, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Apr. 16, 2014), https://ilsr.org/understanding-small-
business-credit-crunch/ [https://perma.cc/4ZZK-N6VT]. 
 85 See GJERSTAD & SMITH, supra note 72, at 80–83 (comparing the recovery from the Great 
Recession to prior U.S. recessions in the twentieth century). 
 86 See Manju Puri, Jörg Rocholl & Sascha Steffen, Global Retail Lending in the Aftermath of the US 
Financial Crisis: Distinguishing Between Supply and Demand Effects, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 556, 564–78 
(2011); Tara Rice & Jonathan Rose, When Good Investments Go Bad: The Contraction in Community 
Bank Lending After the 2008 GSE Takeover, 27 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 68, 78–86 (2016); Rebel A. Cole 
& Jason Damm, How Did the Financial Crisis Affect Small Business Lending in the U.S.? 30–50 (July 
22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1899067 [https://perma.cc/Z6N4-BZAH].  
 87 In particular, risks that are hard for the insurer to observe cannot be fairly priced into an insurance 
contract ex ante. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74–75 
(1979). See generally Ralph A. Winter, Optimal Insurance Under Moral Hazard, in HANDBOOK OF 
INSURANCE 155, 155–57 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) (providing background on moral hazard in 
insurance contracts and its relevance in other contexts).  
 88 See generally Yuk-Shee Chan, Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Is Fairly Priced Deposit 
Insurance Possible?, 47 J. FIN. 227 (1992) (asserting that it is impossible to fairly price deposit insurance 
because of moral hazard); John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 103–21 (2015) (analyzing moral hazard across both deposit insurance 
and implicit insurance from bailouts such as the TARP). 
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the scope of government deposit insurance and destabilizing risk-taking by 
insured banks.89 
Moral hazard is relevant to the too-many-to-fail problem because of the 
FDIC’s TAGP program, which guaranteed small-bank deposits in the United 
States for more than two years.90 At its peak, guarantees from the TAGP 
covered over 6,800 participating banks and close to $1 trillion assets.91 
Although Dodd-Frank later capped FDIC deposit insurance at $250,000 per 
customer,92 TAGP signaled to small banks that, in the event of another 
serious downturn, policymakers could attempt to circumvent these limits to 
calm financial markets.93 Thus, while de jure deposit insurance is capped at 
$250,000, the de facto level of government deposit guarantees is now 
potentially unlimited.94 All else equal, the higher the insurance coverage, the 
greater the moral hazard.95 
Among the most familiar tropes that emerged from the financial crisis 
was the imperative of saving Main Street consumers and businesses from 
Wall Street banks.96 After taking account of the overlooked too-many-to-fail 
crisis, that slogan is in need of revision: as it happened, Main Street was hurt 
by Main Street banks as well. Moreover, because of the moral hazard 
introduced by emergency measures to stabilize community banks during the 
crisis, these institutions are now encouraged to adopt risky business models 
 
 89 See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, Deposit Insurance: Theories and Facts, 
8 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 97, 109–12 (2016); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, Deposit Insurance 
Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 175, 184–90 (2002). 
 90 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at 51–52. 
 91 See id. at 52–53. 
 92 Dodd-Frank increased the FDIC deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 per ownership 
account category, per depositor, per institution. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1540 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)).  
 93 Cf. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Too Many to Fail—An Analysis of Time-Inconsistency 
in Bank Closure Policies, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 1 (2007) (“[W]hen the number of bank failures 
is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the 
number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks.”). 
 94 The Dodd-Frank Act purported to prohibit the FDIC from increasing the deposit insurance limit in 
a future crisis. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 54, at 60; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5612(f). Scholars have 
argued, however, that the FDIC ignored limits on its legal authority when it created the TAGP in 2008. 
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During a Financial Crisis?, 101 MINN. 
L. REV. 1529, 1560–63 (2017) (describing the FDIC’s stated legal basis for the TAGP as “a stretch”). 
Accordingly, Dodd-Frank’s new restrictions on the FDIC’s authority might not prevent the FDIC from 
issuing blanket deposit guarantees in practice. 
 95 See Winter, supra note 87, at 155. 
 96 See, e.g., SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL 
STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 7, 323–54 (2012) (arguing that large financial institutions 
should bear the risk of “imprudent behavior” to incentivize protecting the interests of consumers and 
taxpayers). 
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that will be prone to collapse when the next business-cycle trough hits. The 
upshot is that when it comes to financial regulation, saving Americans from 
Wall Street is not enough. Financial regulators must account for the direct, 
indirect, and long-term costs of instability in the community bank sector as 
well. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The preceding discussion has sought to correct a number of common 
misconceptions about the role that small banks play in connection with the 
problem of systemic risk. Its main conclusions can be summarized as 
follows. 
First, every banking crisis in American history has involved a too-
many-to-fail component, including 2008. Second, prior to 2008, the too-big-
to-fail problem had not characterized a single U.S. banking crisis, despite the 
growth of large banks over the preceding four decades.97 Third, even if every 
too-big-to-fail bank had remained perfectly stable in 2008, the too-many-to-
fail crisis would have nonetheless occurred, and likely with comparable 
severity. The most plausible counterfactual is that the too-many-to-fail crisis 
from 2008 to 2013 would rank as either the second- or third-worst banking 
crisis in modern American history, alongside the 1980s S&L collapse. 
Fourth, the economic dynamics underlying the latest too-many-to-fail crisis 
were not unique. Instead, they are consistent with textbook principles of 
financial theory on banking-sector vulnerability and unfolded in a manner 
that closely paralleled prior historical episodes. Finally, the costs of the too-
many-to-fail crisis were not contained to the banking sector. Rather, there 
were strong negative spillovers to the real economy, which created a 
substantial drag on the recovery from the Great Recession. 
The straightforward takeaway from these conclusions is that a well-
designed financial regulatory system must treat community banks as a 
significant source of systemic risk. As will be explained below, that lesson 
was largely lost in the postcrisis policy debate and is not reflected in the 
changes introduced by Dodd-Frank or subsequent regulatory reforms. 
 
 97 Of course, regulatory intervention may have prevented some too-big-to-fail banks from triggering 
broader distress. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL 
RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4–8 (2010) (discussing the resolution of 
Franklin National Bank in 1974, emergency assistance to First Pennsylvania in 1980, and rescue of 
Continental Illinois in 1984). 
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II. THE MYTH OF EXCESSIVE COMMUNITY BANK REGULATION 
Despite the too-many-to-fail problem, policymakers and scholars have 
devoted little attention to the safety and soundness of community banks. In 
fact, the opposite is true: to the extent that policymakers have focused on 
community banks, they have generally sought to reduce community bank 
regulation. Community bank regulatory relief has become a bipartisan 
touchstone, with legislators from both major parties proclaiming that post-
2008 reforms unfairly disadvantaged smaller banks.98 Legal scholars have 
rallied around this sentiment as well.99 Even fervent banking sector critics 
like Professor Arthur Wilmarth insist that community banks are subject to 
excessive regulation.100 In short, the regulatory and scholarly consensus has 
coalesced around two views: (1) that postcrisis rules were uniquely 
burdensome for community banks, and (2) that community banks require 
regulatory relief to compete effectively. 
Each of these claims, however, is a myth. This Part explains why claims 
of excessive community bank regulation are unfounded. Section II.A 
provides the legal analysis. It argues that post-2008 prudential regulatory 
reforms did not target community banks. In fact, postcrisis rules helped 
community banks in many ways. Section II.B then explains why the case for 
community bank regulatory relief lacks merit from an economic perspective. 
It shows that Dodd-Frank has had no discernable negative impact on the 
financial performance of community banks. To the contrary, most of the 
latest data on the small-banking sector indicate that it has been thriving. 
A. Assessing Postcrisis Community Bank Regulation 
Despite claims to the contrary, postcrisis rules did not impose unique 
regulatory burdens on community banks. Instead, policymakers focused 
primarily on reining in the largest banks. In many cases, Congress and the 
federal banking agencies shielded community banks from new regulatory 
burdens and adopted several provisions affirmatively benefiting smaller 
 
 98 See, e.g., Mike Konczal, The Power of Community Banks, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2016, 9:47 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/08/political-power-community-banks-hillary-clinton-
000192 [https://perma.cc/E3D3-B9A6]. 
 99 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 216–24 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s impact on community banks); 
Schooner, supra note 14, at 158 (asserting that Dodd-Frank compounded community banks’ heavy 
regulatory burden); see also Butz, supra note 22, 465–67 (discussing the Volcker Rule’s “unfair and 
disproportionate” effects on community banks); Newell, supra note 22, at 15–16 (surveying evidence of 
community banks’ compliance costs post-Dodd-Frank); Wilson, supra note 22, at 480–85 (contending 
that Dodd-Frank increases the regulatory burden on community banks). 
 100 See Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 282–88 (asserting that Dodd-Frank imposes heavy compliance 
burdens on community banks). 
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firms. This Section therefore refutes the popular narrative that post-2008 
reforms were uniquely onerous for community banks. 
1. Dodd-Frank Did Not Target Community Banks 
Dodd-Frank and related regulatory initiatives did not single out 
community banks for adverse regulatory treatment. In fact, to the extent that 
these reforms distinguished community banks from larger institutions, they 
protected small banks from harsher rules. Although some postcrisis 
prudential rules apply to all banks regardless of their size, the federal 
financial regulators went out of their way to minimize the impact of a one-
size-fits-all approach for smaller firms. Thus, the claim that postcrisis 
reforms unfairly discriminate against community banks lacks merit. 
As an initial matter, Dodd-Frank did not establish a single new statutory 
burden unique to community banks within its nearly 1,000 pages.101 Instead, 
Dodd-Frank sought to safeguard the biggest, internationally active banks, 
which were perceived as the primary culprits of the 2008 crisis.102 As one of 
the Act’s cosponsors, Senator Christopher Dodd, asserted: “The law is 
squarely aimed at better regulating the largest and most complex Wall Street 
firms—the ones that were most responsible for the crisis and still present the 
most risk.”103 Even vociferous critics concede that “[s]mall banks were not a 
principal regulatory target of Dodd-Frank.”104 
In the handful of instances where Dodd-Frank explicitly referenced 
community banks, it was to exempt them from potentially onerous rules. For 
example, § 165 of Dodd-Frank—which established heightened prudential 
standards such as stress tests, liquidity requirements, and resolution plans—
exempted banks with less than $50 billion in assets.105 Policymakers likewise 
 
 101 Cf. AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM, THE IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON COMMUNITY BANKS (2010), 
https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/CLAIMS-AND-FACTS-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DKG6-GY8U] (noting that “[m]any key [Dodd-Frank] provisions apply exclusively or 
mainly to big banks” and “parts of Dodd Frank help shield community banks . . . against unfair 
competition” (emphasis in original)). 
 102 See, e.g., Christopher J. Dodd, Five Myths About Dodd-Frank, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-dodd-frank-financial-regulations/2011 
/10/19/gIQAtq7j4L_story.html [https://perma.cc/224V-Y3H4]. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Hester Peirce, Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, How Are Small Banks Faring Under Dodd-
Frank? 7 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/ 
Peirce_SmallBankSurvey_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB3W-S455]. 
 105 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1)). Dodd-Frank required a large bank holding company to participate in annual 
stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve and by the company itself to assess whether the firm could 
withstand a hypothetical economic downturn while maintaining at least the minimum required level of 
capital. See Matthew C. Turk, Stress Testing the Banking Agencies, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1701, 1713–15 
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shielded community banks from other novel requirements in the statute, 
including rules for derivatives clearing,106 executive compensation limits,107 
and risk-management standards.108 Moreover, Dodd-Frank exempted 
community banks from supervision by the newly created Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).109 Congress and the financial 
regulatory agencies thereby insulated community banks from many of the 
most significant postcrisis reforms. 
To be sure, some one-size-fits-all postcrisis rules applied to community 
banks. For instance, Dodd-Frank required all banks to demonstrate 
compliance with the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions on proprietary trading and 
investments in covered funds, regardless of their size.110 In addition, the 
international Basel III capital accord raised certain capital requirements 
applicable to all domestic banks.111 Dodd-Frank also instructed all depository 
institutions to ascertain whether mortgage borrowers could reasonably be 
 
(2020). The statute exempted banks with less than $50 billion in assets from Federal Reserve-run stress 
tests and banks with less than $10 billion in assets from both Federal Reserve-run and company-run stress 
tests. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i). Dodd-Frank’s most prominent liquidity rule requires that a bank 
holding company maintain sufficient high-quality liquid assets to withstand thirty days of net cash 
outflows during economic stress. See Turk, supra, at 1752 n.239. Dodd-Frank’s resolution-planning 
requirement directs a large bank holding company to develop a “living will” outlining how the firm could 
be resolved in an orderly fashion if it were to become insolvent. See Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case 
Against the Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 
9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 39–58 (2012). 
 106 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 50.50(d) (2019) (exempting banks with $10 billion or less in assets from 
derivatives-clearing requirements); Dodd-Frank Act § 723 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2). Dodd-
Frank’s derivatives clearing provisions direct the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to identify certain standardized, liquid swaps that must be cleared 
through a centralized counterparty or clearinghouse. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, 
Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank 
Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 69–71 & n.121 (2011). 
 107 See Dodd-Frank Act § 956(f) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641(f)) (exempting banks with assets of 
less than $1 billion). 
 108 See id. § 165(h)(2)(A) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h)(2)(A)) (specifying that 
mandatory regulations only apply to companies with consolidated assets of $10 billion or more). Dodd-
Frank’s risk-management standards require a large bank holding company to establish a risk committee 
on its board of directors and employ a qualified chief risk officer. See Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: 
How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 890, 910 (2018). 
 109 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a)(1)) (applying the supervision 
requirement to banks with total assets greater than $10 billion). 
 110 See id. § 619 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1851); see also 12 C.F.R. § 248.20 (2015) 
(establishing compliance-program requirements for banking entities supervised by the Federal Reserve). 
 111 See Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.); see also Shea Dittrich, How Basel III Capital Requirements 
Hurt Community Banks, AM. BANKER (Sept. 26, 2012, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
opinion/how-basel-iii-capital-requirements-hurt-community-banks [https://perma.cc/FG2P-KZ8U] 
(discussing the effects of Basel III’s capital standards on community banks). 
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expected to repay their loans by, among other things, verifying their incomes 
and credit histories.112 Community banks insist that these universally 
applicable rules disproportionately burden them because, unlike big banks, 
they cannot spread compliance costs over a large asset base.113 
Even in the case of these one-size-fits-all rules, however, policymakers 
made special efforts to minimize regulatory burden on community banks. 
For example, the financial regulatory agencies set the new Basel III capital 
requirements at a level where few community banks would be forced to raise 
additional equity.114 The agencies also published community bank guides for 
Basel III, the Volcker Rule, and the “ability-to-repay” rule to help reduce 
compliance costs for small banks.115 Finally, Dodd-Frank required the CFPB 
to follow a unique rulemaking process under the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act, which grants community banks special 
opportunities to comment on proposed CFPB regulations.116 Thus, although 
community banks must comply with some postcrisis reforms, policymakers 
went out of their way to limit regulatory burden on smaller firms. 
 
 112 See Dodd-Frank § 1411 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c note). The CFPB originally 
exempted community banks with less than $2 billion in assets that make 500 or fewer mortgage loans 
annually from the ability-to-repay requirement. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.35(b)(2)(iii), 1026.43(e)(5) 
(2014). Under pressure from community banks, the CFPB later increased the mortgage threshold to 2,000 
loans and excluded originated loans held in portfolio from the limit. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.35(b)(2)(iii), 
1026.43(e)(5) (2019); see also Kaufman, supra note 14, at, 492–93 (discussing community bank pressure 
on CFPB to expand the “small-creditor” exemption). 
 113 See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 5, at 229; Peirce et al., supra note 104, at 12–14. 
 114 Out of more than 4,600 community banks with less than $500 million in assets, only 146 were 
projected to have to raise capital in order to comply with the new Basel III framework. The remaining 
community banks were projected to satisfy the new standards without issuing additional capital. See 
Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed. Reg. 55340, 55467 (Sept. 10, 2013); 
Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018, 62152–55 (Oct. 11, 2013). 
 115 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FDIC & OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF 
CURRENCY, NEW CAPITAL RULE: COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE (2013), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/files/capital_rule_community_bank 
_guide_20130709.pdf [https://perma.cc/846M-3VJ3]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., 
FDIC & OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, THE VOLCKER RULE: COMMUNITY BANK 
APPLICABILITY (2013) [hereinafter VOLCKER RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE], 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-ia-2013-186e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2MWF-LU39]; CFPB, ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE: SMALL 
ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2014), https://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_atr-qm_small-entity-compliance-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
US5Z-CA4J]. The agencies, in particular, went out of their way to minimize the Volcker Rule compliance 
burden on community banks. See VOLCKER RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra, at 1 (“The Final Rule is 
designed to place minimal burden on community banks given the nature of their activities.”). 
 116 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1100G(a) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 609(d)(2)); see also Adam J. Levitin, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 348–52 
(2013) (discussing the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act process). 
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In sum, community banks were not a primary target of postcrisis 
regulatory reforms. Although small banks must comply with some Dodd-
Frank rules, policymakers did not single them out for adverse treatment. To 
the contrary, Congress and financial regulatory agencies intentionally 
shielded community banks from the most onerous new rules. Thus, while 
Dodd-Frank created a complex regulatory framework for the largest U.S. 
banks, community banks avoided most of these compliance burdens. 
2. Some Postcrisis Reforms Helped Community Banks 
Not only did policymakers protect community banks from potentially 
burdensome postcrisis rules, but several reforms affirmatively benefitted 
smaller banks. Dodd-Frank delivered substantial subsidies to community 
banks, which helped offset their new compliance costs. At the same time, 
postcrisis reforms reduced too-big-to-fail subsidies for the largest banks, 
making it easier for community banks to compete. Thus, many overlooked 
reforms in Dodd-Frank actually advantaged smaller firms. 
Policymakers expressly subsidized smaller banks after the financial 
crisis in three ways. First, Dodd-Frank established a new, community-bank-
friendly methodology for assessing contributions to the FDIC’s DIF.117 This 
new framework effectively reduced community banks’ assessments by 
shifting the burden of funding the DIF to banks perceived to be too big to 
fail.118 Second, Dodd-Frank exempted banks with less than $10 billion in 
assets from the Durbin Amendment—a statutory cap on the fees banks may 
charge for debit card transactions.119 Finally, when Congress slashed the 
 
 117 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 331 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817 note) (shifting assessment base 
toward institutions that rely more heavily on nondeposit liabilities); id. § 334 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1813) (shielding banks with less than $10 billion in assets from increased deposit-insurance 
assessments). 
 118 See, e.g., Kyle D. Allen, Travis R. Davidson, Scott E. Hein & Matthew D. Whitledge, Dodd-
Frank’s Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 19 J. BANKING REG. 271, 281 (2018) (concluding that 
community banks saved approximately $190 million per quarter as a result of new assessment 
methodology). 
 119 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1075(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)). As Professor Adam 
Levitin has noted, this exemption effectively subsidized community banks, which now earn considerably 
more than larger banks on every debit card transaction. See Rising Regulatory Compliance Costs and 
Their Impact on the Health of Small Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. 
& Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 17 (2012) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Levitin, Rising Regulatory 
Compliance Costs] (“[T]he Durbin . . . Amendment is the single best piece of legislation for community 
banks in the past [two] decades.”); see also Rising Regulatory Compliance Costs and Their Impact on the 
Health of Small Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 65 (2012) (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor 
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (“[S]maller banks . . . are making on average . . . 19 cents 
more than large banks on every debit card transaction.”).   
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annual dividend that the Federal Reserve pays to member banks from 6% to 
the prevailing ten-year Treasury rate in 2015, policymakers shielded banks 
with less than $10 billion from that reduction.120 
Collectively, these subsidies offset most, if not all, of community 
banks’ new postcrisis prudential regulatory burden. Based on conservative 
estimates, community banks earn roughly $1.25 billion annually from the 
three provisions described above.121 As Table 1 demonstrates, these subsidies 
thus completely negate community banks’ compliance costs associated with 
Basel III, the Volcker Rule, and the ability-to-repay rule—the most 
significant postcrisis prudential reforms applicable to smaller banks.122 All 
told, the new subsidies offset roughly one-quarter of community banks’ $5 
billion in total annual compliance costs.123 These new, but often-overlooked 
subsidies therefore neutralize much of community banks’ well-publicized 
regulatory burden. 
TABLE 1: COMPARING POSTCRISIS COMMUNITY BANK COMPLIANCE COSTS AND SUBSIDIES 
Annual Compliance Costs ($ 
millions) 
Annual Subsidies ($ millions) 
Basel III124 $238 Deposit insurance premium reduction125 $760 
 
 120 See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 32203(a), 129 Stat. 1312, 
1739–40 (2015) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 289(a)(1)(A)(ii)). 
 121 See infra Table 1; infra notes 125, 127, 129. 
 122 These estimates take into account only the direct costs of complying with the relevant 
regulations—such as paperwork, recordkeeping, and disclosure requirements—and not indirect effects of 
these regulations, such as foregone revenues or higher costs of capital. 
 123 The Federal Reserve and Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) have estimated that 
community bank compliance costs ranged from $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion annually between 2014 and 
2018. See FED. RSRV. SYS., FDIC & CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, COMMUNITY BANKING IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 2019, at 54 (2019), https://www.communitybanking.org/~/media/files/publication/ 
cb21publication_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE9J-C6GV]. 
 124 Total compliance costs for banks with less than $10 billion in assets were $5.4 billion in 2016, 
according to estimates by the Federal Reserve and CSBS. Of that total, 4.4%—or $238 million—was 
attributable to compliance with Basel III. See FED. RSRV. SYS. & CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, 
COMMUNITY BANKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2017, at 20–21 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 COMMUNITY 
BANK SURVEY], https://www.communitybanking.org/~/media/files/cb21pub_2017_book_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TLM8-C7HE]. 
 125 According to an academic study, Dodd-Frank’s deposit-insurance reforms have reduced 
community banks’ assessments by approximately $190 million per quarter, or $760 million per year. See 
Allen et al., supra note 118, at 281. This figure underestimates the full benefit of the deposit-insurance 
reforms, as it omits rebates to which community banks have been entitled since the Deposit Insurance 
Fund Reserve Ratio reached a threshold of 1.38% in June 2019. See Deposit Insurance Assessments: 
Small Bank Credits, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/small-bank-credits.html 
[https://perma.cc/HJC7-UDTH] (last updated Dec. 23, 2019) (explaining FDIC small-bank assessment 
credits and reporting that the Reserve Ratio reached 1.40% in June 2019); Deposit Insurance 
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Volcker Rule126 $47 Durbin Amendment exemption127 $327 
Ability-to-repay 
rule128 
$793 Federal Reserve dividend exemption129 $128 
Total Compliance 
Costs 
$1,078 Total Subsidies $1,215 
 
Assessments: Assessment Changes Since 2016, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/ 
assessments/changesassessments.html#:~:text=When%20the%20reserve%20ratio%20reaches,1.35%25
%20(see%20below) [https://perma.cc/K5ZH-GWDW] (noting the Reserve Ratio threshold for small-
bank credits). The value of rebates is expected to approach $765 million. See Andy Peters, Small Banks 
About to Catch Break on Deposit Insurance Premiums, AM. BANKER (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:19 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/small-banks-about-to-catch-break-on-deposit-insurance-
premiums [https://perma.cc/2KQ2-WSU4].  
 126 The Federal Reserve estimated that the paperwork, recordkeeping, and disclosure-related 
requirements associated with the Volcker Rule resulted in $9,225 in annual compliance costs, on average, 
for a community bank. See Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 35008, 35012 
n.44 (July 22, 2019). Multiplying across 5,113 insured depository institutions with less than $10 billion 
in assets results in a total community bank Volcker Rule compliance burden of roughly $47 million 
annually. See Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2019, 13 FDIC Q., no. 4, 2019, at 7 (providing 
number of banks with less than $10 billion in assets). 
 127 Professors Vladimir Mukharlyamov and Natasha Sarin have calculated that the Durbin 
Amendment reduced interchange income for banks subject to the rule by approximately 25%. See 
Mukharlyamov & Sarin, supra note 30, at 19. According to data reported on the Federal Reserve’s Form 
FR Y-9C and accessed on the Wharton Research Data Services database, banks with less than $10 billion 
in assets earned a total of $1.31 billion in interchange income in 2010, before the Durbin Amendment 
became effective. Therefore, assuming that the Durbin Amendment would have affected community and 
noncommunity banks equally, the community bank exemption from the Durbin Amendment effectively 
subsidized those banks by roughly $327 million per year. 
 128 This figure includes community banks’ costs of complying with both the ability-to-repay rule and 
the qualified-mortgage rule, a safe harbor provision that permits banks to presumptively satisfy the 
ability-to-repay requirement by issuing mortgages with certain standardized terms. See Patricia A. McCoy 
& Susan M. Wachter, The Macroprudential Implications of the Qualified Mortgage Debate, 83 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 28–31 (2020) (discussing the ability-to-repay rule and qualified-mortgage safe 
harbor). The Federal Reserve and CSBS estimated that the ability-to-repay rule and qualified-mortgage 
rules accounted for 6.7% and 8.0%, respectively, of community banks’ compliance costs in 2016. See 
2017 COMMUNITY BANK SURVEY, supra note 124, at 20. Thus, out of community banks’ total $5.4 billion 
compliance burden, approximately $793 million was attributable to the ability-to-repay requirement and 
qualified-mortgage safe harbor. See id. at 21. 
 129 The Federal Reserve paid a total of $1.7 billion in dividends to member banks in 2015, before the 
dividend rate cut became effective. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., 105TH ANNUAL 
REPORT 318 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-annual-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AD8H-6WMP]. When the rate cut went into effect in 2016—and banks with $10 billion or 
more in assets received a dividend equal to the prevailing ten-year Treasury rate instead of 6%—total 
dividends paid dropped to $711 million. See id. at 318, 362–63. Assuming that the Federal Reserve paid 
a 2% dividend to banks subject to the rate cut, we algebraically determine that the community bank 
exemption from the rate cut was worth approximately $128 million to banks with less than $10 billion in 
assets. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY AUCTION RESULTS (2016), 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2016/R_20161109_1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8YRE-9LVA] (noting the high yield of the ten-year Treasury note was 2.02%). 
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In addition to creating new subsidies for community banks, postcrisis 
reforms also reduced subsidies for large banks—thereby making it easier for 
small banks to compete on a level playing field. For many years, banks 
considered “too big to fail” borrowed at artificially low rates because 
creditors believed that the government would bail out such firms rather than 
allow them to collapse.130 Community banks have often contended that this 
implicit subsidy gave large banks an unfair advantage over smaller banks, 
which lacked the government’s implicit backing and therefore had a higher 
cost of capital.131 By imposing new prudential rules on the largest banks and 
creating a more credible big-bank resolution regime, however, Dodd-Frank 
substantially reduced the too-big-to-fail subsidy.132 According to one study, 
for example, the Dodd-Frank reforms shrank the implicit subsidy for the 
largest banks by 94%.133 By reducing big-bank subsidies, policymakers 
helped community banks compete with larger banks on more equal terms. 
Other postcrisis reforms have aided community banks through more 
subtle channels. In 2015, for example, Congress mandated that at least one 
seat on the Federal Reserve’s seven-member governing board be reserved 
for a person with experience working in or supervising community banks.134 
The primary effect of this special designation is to give community banks 
 
 130 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The “Too Big to Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2500 
(2019) (discussing the “too-big-to-fail” subsidy). 
 131 See INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., END TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL 3, 10–11 (2013), https://www. 
icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/news-documents/press-release/2013/endtbtfstudy.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9LGW-YUWL]. 
 132 The reduced magnitude of the too-big-to-fail subsidy may also reflect creditors’ belief, in light of 
the TAGP, that community banks also enjoy an implicit government backstop. Econometric studies, 
however, typically attribute the decline in too-big-to-fail banks’ funding advantage to the effect of Dodd-
Frank. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM 
LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 104–25 (2014), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/ 
GFSR/Issues/2016/12/31/Moving-from-Liquidity-to-Growth-Driven-Markets [https://perma.cc/J6EV-
63HD] (concluding that postcrisis regulatory reforms limited the too-big-to-fail subsidy in the United 
States).  
 133 See Bhanu Balasubramnian & Ken B. Cyree, Has Market Discipline on Banks Improved After the 
Dodd-Frank Act?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 155, 165 (2014); see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 
132, at 104–19; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-621, LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: 
EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 46–55 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7M77-6V6N] (finding that expectations of government support for large banks 
diminished after the Dodd-Frank Act). But see Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & Joe Warburton, The 
End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees 30–33 (Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 79700, 2016) (finding that Dodd-Frank did not significantly 
reduce expectations of government support for large financial institutions). 
 134 Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1, § 109(a), 
129 Stat. 3, 9 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 241). 
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greater influence over future regulatory matters.135 Additionally, as 
mentioned above, Dodd-Frank raised the deposit-insurance limit from 
$100,000 to $250,000 per account, which will help community banks 
compete against larger banks for consumer deposits.136 Lastly, Dodd-Frank 
eliminated disclosure requirements that had previously forced small, 
publicly traded banks to report annually on the effectiveness of their internal 
controls over financial reporting.137 With these various reforms, 
policymakers both empowered community banks and mitigated their 
compliance burden. 
In sum, community banks benefitted from Dodd-Frank and other 
postcrisis reforms in several underappreciated ways. Policymakers not only 
subsidized community banks directly, they also rolled back implicit 
subsidies for larger firms. In total, this redistribution likely offset the 
financial drag from new prudential regulations imposed on community banks 
after the crisis. Any assessment of postcrisis community bank regulation is 
thus fatally incomplete unless it accounts for the substantial benefits such 
firms received in the aftermath of 2008. 
B. The Empty Case for Community Bank Regulatory Relief 
Even though Dodd-Frank did not disproportionately burden smaller 
firms, the community bank lobby and even impartial observers insist that 
small banks need regulatory relief in order to remain viable. This conclusion 
is usually supported by two claims: (1) the community bank sector has 
experienced economic decline in the decade following the financial crisis, 
and (2) community banks require deregulation or explicit subsidies to 
compete with larger firms. Both of these premises, however, are false. As 
this Section demonstrates, community banks have generally thrived since the 
2008 financial crisis. And, for related reasons, additional small-bank 
deregulation or subsidization is unwarranted. 
 
 135 See Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Senate Approves Move to Reserve Fed Seat for Community Banks, 
WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2014, 1:21 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/07/17/senate-approves-
move-to-reserve-fed-seat-for-community-banks/ [https://perma.cc/TAZ8-3AYW]. 
 136 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(a)(1)(E)); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND 
CREDIT UNIONS: IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS 24 
(2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648210.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RKA-F72W] (“According to 
FDIC, the higher insurance coverage level should help community banks attract and retain core 
deposits.”). 
 137 See Dodd-Frank Act § 989G (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262). The Government Accountability 
Office estimated that auditing fees associated with these reporting requirements cost small, publicly 
traded companies roughly $250,000 per year, on average. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra 
note 136, at 26–27. 
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1. Community Banks Have Thrived Since the Financial Crisis 
The case for community bank regulatory relief typically proceeds from 
the observation that the sector has been “shrinking” in the years since Dodd-
Frank was enacted in 2010.138 In one very narrow sense, this observation is 
correct. According to FDIC statistics, there were roughly 6,500 community 
banks with less than $10 billion in assets in the United States in 2010.139 By 
2020, there were 4,337.140 When placed in broader context, however, this 
headline figure does little to illuminate the relationship between postcrisis 
reforms and small banks. Taking into account historical trends, 
macroeconomic forces, and cross-sectional performance, the community 
bank sector has on the whole experienced healthy growth, despite the overall 
decline in the number of small banks. 
The decreasing number of community banks is not a new trend. To the 
contrary, there has been a roughly continuous decline in the population of 
community banks since the mid-1990s.141 Any reduction in the amount of 
community banks since 2010 therefore reflects the persistence of a trend that 
began long before Dodd-Frank.142 To the extent the quantity of community 
banks is a relevant metric for gauging the economic health of the small-
banking sector, post-2008 reforms have no correlation with the rate of 
change in that variable over time. 
Moreover, as Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has recently 
noted, taking a disaggregated view of the community bank sector is critical 
because the performance of small financial institutions has been far from 
uniform.143 Indeed, the headline trend of community bank decline, upon 
which advocates of regulatory relief rely, is driven almost entirely by a 
collapse in the number of banks with less than $100 million in assets.144 
Between 1995 and 2010, community banks in the $1 billion to $10 billion 
size bracket roughly doubled in number, growing at a faster rate than banks 
 
 138 See, e.g., Peirce et al., supra note 104, at 10–11. 
 139 Quarterly Banking Profile: Fourth Quarter 2010, 5 FDIC Q., no. 1, 2011, at 7. 
 140 Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2020, 14 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2020, at 7. 
 141 See Jerome H. Powell, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Trends in Community 
Bank Performance over the Past 20 Years: Remarks at Fourth Annual Community Banking Research and 
Policy Conference 2, fig.1 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/ 
powell20160929a.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4PS-WLU6].  
 142 See id. at 2–4.  
 143 See id.  
 144 See id. at 3; see also MARTIN NEIL BAILY & NICHOLAS MONTALBANO, BROOKINGS ECON. 
STUDS., THE COMMUNITY BANKS: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, PART III, at 1 (2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Baily_Montalbano_CommunityBanks_122115 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TH3-LPG6] (showing variation in the growth of relatively large and small 
community banks). 
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above that threshold.145 The quantity of community banks with between $300 
million and $1 billion in assets followed a similar trajectory as well.146 Thus, 
in contrast to the popular narrative, the number of community banks above 
the very smallest size threshold has been rising at a rapid clip, not shrinking. 
Importantly, the shrinking population of micro-community banks with 
less than $100 million in assets is almost entirely unrelated to Dodd-Frank. 
The most important drivers of this decline are legal reforms from the 1980s 
and 1990s, such as the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994,147 which allowed banks to operate multiple branches 
and merge across state lines for the first time.148 As a result, the smallest 
banks were absorbed into larger conglomerates through acquisition and 
typically converted into branches of the acquiring bank thereafter.149 The 
drop in standalone community banks during the initial decades of banking 
industry consolidation is therefore easily explained—prior to the mid-1980s, 
it was illegal for community banks to expand through mergers.150 
In addition to these precrisis reforms, the smallest community banks 
have declined in number since the financial crisis for two separate reasons. 
The first is organic growth. For some years, up to 90% of the micro-sized 
community banks that have “disappeared” since Dodd–Frank simply moved 
up to the next size bracket.151 Rather than being acquired or shackled by new 
regulations, these banks merely crossed definitional categories by expanding 
their lending activities and gaining market share. 
The second reason is a lack of entry by newly chartered institutions, 
known as “de novo banks.”152 Most new banks are small and, somewhat 
remarkably, not a single de novo bank was chartered in the United States 
from 2010 to 2015.153 From 1995 to 2007, the average rate of de novo bank 
 
 145 Powell, supra note 141, at 2–3. 
 146 Id. at 3. The number of banks with between $100 million and $300 million in assets declined by 
“a very modest percentage.” Id. 
 147 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-328, 
§§ 101–02, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339–52 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 148 See generally Philip E. Strahan, The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation, 85 FED. RSRV. 
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 111, 111, 114 (2003) (analyzing the role of regulatory reforms from the 1970s to 
1990s on the increasing concentration of the banking sector which followed). 
 149 CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 34, at 193–202 (discussing early bank mergers).  
 150 See id. 
 151 See Powell, supra note 141, at 3. 
 152 See Roisin McCord & Edward Simpson Prescott, The Financial Crisis, the Collapse of Bank 
Entry, and Changes in the Size Distribution of Banks, 100 FED RSRV. BANK RICH. ECON. Q. 23, 23–24 
(2014). 
 153 See Powell, supra note 141, at 3–4, fig.6. 
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charters hovered around 130 institutions per year.154 As Federal Reserve 
Chairman Powell points out, once controlling for the recent lack of entry—
in a counterfactual world where the precrisis pace of de novo charters held 
steady—there would have been no increased rate of decline in the number of 
community banks since 2010.155 
Critically, this drop in small de novo banks cannot be attributed to 
regulatory burden imposed by postcrisis reforms. According to one leading 
academic study, 75% of the reduction in new entry is explained by adverse 
macroeconomic conditions during the Great Recession, independent of 
regulatory changes.156 Specifically, the low-interest-rate environment and 
limited demand for credit after 2008 meant that opening a de novo bank was 
an unattractive business proposition.157 
More fundamentally, the total number of community banks is less 
relevant to the overall performance of the small-banking sector than is their 
lending and profitability. Here again, the data do not reflect any effect from 
Dodd-Frank. While earnings of community banks above the $100 million 
threshold lagged slightly behind those of the too-big-to-fail institutions 
between 1995 and 2010, that gap did not widen in subsequent years.158 
Moreover, total lending by community banks across nearly all size categories 
has grown steadily since 2010 and returned to precrisis levels.159 The relevant 
data therefore do not suggest that community banks have suffered as a result 
of Dodd-Frank. 
Notably, mid-sized community banks with between $300 million and 
$1 billion in assets “have been the most consistently profitable group among 
community banks . . . [and have] performed as well as banks with $1 billion 
to $10 billion in assets.”160 If the regulatory relief hypothesis is that Dodd-
Frank’s legal burden increases significantly with the inverse of bank size, 
one would expect that the largest community banks would have 
 
 154 See Number of New Banks Created by Year, 1993 to 2018, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE 
(May 14, 2019), https://ilsr.org/number-of-new-banks-created-by-year-1993-to-2013/ [https://perma.cc/ 
73WB-GC92]. 
 155 See Powell, supra note 141, at 4, fig.6. 
 156 Robert M. Adams & Jacob Gramlich, Where Are All the New Banks? The Role of Regulatory 
Burden in New Bank Formation, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 181, 204 (2016). 
 157 See id. A 2016 study undertaken by the Obama Administration’s Council of Economic Advisors 
arrived at the same conclusion. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY 
BANKS OVER TIME 2 (2016). 
 158 See Powell, supra note 141, at 5; Baily & Montalbano, supra note 144, at 8. 
 159 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 157, at 2 (“The annual growth rate of lending 
by community banks in each asset range . . . has increased since the financial crisis and reached levels . . . 
in line with rates seen prior to the crisis . . . .”). 
 160 See Powell, supra note 141, at 5, fig.7. 
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outperformed mid-sized community banks after 2010. But that does not 
appear to be the case: there has been no compression of profits or lending 
within the community bank sector relative to size over time, nor for 
community banks relative to too-big-to-fail banks.161 
The regulatory-relief hypothesis fares even worse in light of the latest 
FDIC data for 2018 and 2019. Small banks have experienced double-digit 
earnings growth the past two years, with the rise in community bank profits 
exceeding earnings at too-big-to-fail institutions in several financial 
quarters.162 Indeed, at year-end 2019, FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams 
boasted that community banks “reported another positive quarter,” with “the 
annual loan growth rate at community banks outpac[ing] the overall 
industry’s growth rate.”163 
Viewed as a whole, community banks’ financial performance reveals 
that the regulatory-burden narrative surrounding postcrisis reforms relies 
more on myth than fact. After disaggregating among community banks and 
accounting for economic factors unrelated to the regulatory environment, the 
number and profitability of community banks shows no relationship to the 
passage of Dodd-Frank. And putting micro-sized community banks aside, 
the small banking sector is thriving. This outcome should not be mysterious 
in light of the analysis presented by the foregoing Part. As that discussion 
explained, postcrisis reforms largely ignored small banks, while explicitly 
targeting a wide variety of novel restrictions at too-big-to-fail institutions.164 
The unsurprising result is that the community-bank sector has flourished 
over the past several years, notwithstanding claims to the contrary. 
2. Community Banks Do Not Require Special Subsidies 
In a financial system dominated by too-big-to-fail megabanks, it is 
tempting to conceptualize the community bank sector as a beleaguered 
 
 161 See id.; see also Jared Fronk, Core Profitability of Community Banks: 1985–2015, 10 FDIC Q., 
no. 4, 2016, at 37 (providing statistics on the profitability of community banks in the decades before and 
after the financial crisis, following the same performance trends as the banking industry overall). 
 162 See, e.g., Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2019, 13 FDIC Q., no. 4, 2019, at 1, 15 
(reporting that community banks’ net income increased by 7.2% year-over-year, compared to a decline 
in net income for large banks); Quarterly Banking Profile: Second Quarter 2019, 13 FDIC Q., no. 3, 
2019, at 1, 15 (reporting that community bank net income increased by 8.1% year-over-year, compared 
to only 4.1% for the banking sector as a whole); see also Martin Neil Baily & Nicholas Montalbano, Post-
Crisis, Community Banks Are Doing Better than the Big Four by Some Measures, BROOKINGS (Dec. 21, 
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/post-crisis-community-banks-are-doing-better-than-the-big-
four-by-some-measures/ [https://perma.cc/V4Y6-93DQ]. 
 163 Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks on the Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2019 
Quarterly Banking Profile (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spfeb2520.html 
[https://perma.cc/8QDF-RHQJ]. 
 164 See supra Section II.A. 
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underdog. But that would be a mistake. The conventional wisdom that 
community banks require deregulation has in large part gained acceptance 
due to decades of financial sector lobbying.165 The small-bank lobby—now 
led by the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA)—is among 
the most successful political interest groups in U.S. history and has wielded 
outsized influence over financial regulation since the early nineteenth 
century.166 The regulatory relief narrative that has taken hold since 2010 is 
only its latest achievement. 
This industry-led campaign has been buttressed by support from 
academic commentators as well.167 Indeed, the modest body of legal 
scholarship that has examined community banking in recent years reflects a 
nearly uniform view that small banks have been overly burdened by Dodd-
Frank and related postcrisis reforms.168 Much of this academic literature goes 
even further. Academics often assert that community banks not only need 
regulatory relief in order to survive but also require implicit or explicit 
subsidies in order to remain viable in the modern financial system.169 
Banking law experts, including Professors Marsh and Wilmarth, 
generally present three arguments why affirmative community-bank 
subsidies are necessary. First, they argue that the alleged decline of 
 
 165 See, e.g., Konczal, supra note 98. 
 166 Support for community banks is historically rooted in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian populist 
tradition, with agrarian interests strongly favoring small, locally run banks to larger banks in urban money 
centers. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND 
THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 28–32 (2015). This historical coalition of rural famers and small bankers 
has shaped U.S. financial regulatory policy ever since. See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 34, at 154–
55 (tracing the role of populists and community bankers in the evolution of the U.S. banking sector). 
Urban interests have likewise supported the community bank sector as an alternative to too-big-to-fail 
banks for meeting the needs of underserved communities. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR 
OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 230–35 (2017) (discussing efforts to promote 
small banks in low- and moderate-income communities). For information on the role of the ICBA, see 
About ICBA, INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., https://www.icba.org/about [https://perma.cc/7UYH-
X8B6]. 
 167 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 253–54 (arguing that postcrisis reforms “benefited 
megabanks while suppressing the earnings of community banks”). But see Schooner, supra note 14, at 
146 (taking a skeptical view of deregulating community banks). 
 168 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 277 (“The future viability of community banks has also been 
called into question because of . . . the costly new compliance requirements that Dodd-Frank and the 
Basel III capital accord have imposed on community banks.”); see also Newell, supra note 22, at 14 
(“Dodd-Frank compels both large banks and community banks to meet new regulatory requirements even 
though community banks played no substantial role in the financial crisis.”). 
 169 For example, Professor Wilmarth has advocated for: (a) more federal aid for community banks 
during the crisis; (b) federally subsidized small-business loan guarantees for community banks; (c) 
relaxed supervisory scrutiny for community banks; and (d) regulatory forbearance for community banks 
that fail to satisfy supervisory standards. Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 257, 268, 277–81, 340–42.  
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community banks must be prevented because small banks provide an 
important counterweight to the concentration of financial assets in too-big-
to-fail institutions.170 Second, they contend that any reduction in the number 
of community banks should be avoided because further consolidation of the 
banking sector will have a negative effect on access to credit for small 
businesses and local communities.171 And third, they argue that absent 
subsidies, community banks—and the specialized relational-lending services 
that they provide—will be displaced because small banks cannot withstand 
“competitive pressures” from larger banks when all financial firms operate 
on an even playing field.172 Upon closer inspection, however, none of these 
three justifications for community bank subsidies is persuasive. 
First, the view that policymakers should support community banks to 
prevent concentration of the financial sector in too-big-to-fail institutions is 
a red herring. As many community banks are quite small, any attempt to 
bolster their number would yield trivial results, even in the most optimistic 
case.173 For example, assuming the number of banks with less than $100 
million in assets doubled overnight, the aggregate increase in assets in the 
community bank sector would equal roughly $120 billion.174 Further 
assuming that all assets held by those new small banks were diverted from a 
single too-big-to-fail bank such as JPMorgan, the decline in JPMorgan’s 
assets would be negligible, falling from $2.6 trillion to $2.5 trillion.175 As it 
stands, nearly half of all banking-system assets are held by the five largest 
institutions.176 If the too-big-to-fail issue or excessive financial sector 
concentration are policy problems, the appropriate remedy is to break up the 
 
 170 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 185–86; Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 250. 
 171 See Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 299 (“Any further decline in the competitive presence of 
community banks would harm consumers and local communities as well as entrepreneurs.”); Stephen 
Michael Spivey, Note, A Snake Eating Its Own Tail: The Self-Defeating Nature of an Overly Broad 
Implementation of Section 1071, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 107, 117–19 (2018). 
 172 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 224–25; Newell, supra note 22, at 3 (advocating that the “FDIC should 
continue its recent trend of loosening community-banking regulations in order to maintain the competitive 
balance of the banking industry”); Spivey, supra note 171, at 122 (“[C]ompetitive pressures and 
burdensome compliance costs . . . [are] shrinking the [small-banking] market and leading some in the 
industry to predict that community banks will eventually disappear entirely.”). 
 173 As of September 2019, there were 1,206 community banks with less than $100 million in assets. 
Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2019, supra note 62, at 1, 7. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 40 (Feb. 25, 2020). 
 176 See Jeff Cox, 5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half the Industry, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2015, 2:33 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/15/5-biggest-banks-now-own-almost-half-the-industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/4WQW-SNEE] (explaining that JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, 
Citigroup, and U.S. Bancorp together control 44.61% of the industry’s total assets). 
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biggest banks.177 Artificially supporting community banks will not 
meaningfully address these issues. 
Second, subsidizing community banks to preserve access to credit in 
“underbanked” areas would be equally misguided. Legal scholarship has 
suggested that certain geographies have lost physical access to financial 
services as a result of community bank consolidation.178 But this concern is 
overstated. When small banks are acquired, they do not disappear.179 Rather, 
the acquirer typically converts the target bank into a branch and therefore 
maintains operations in the target’s original community.180 To be sure, there 
is some evidence that the acquisition of a community bank by a larger, out-
of-market institution reduces the supply of credit to the target’s 
community.181 But in the case of the smallest community banks, this effect is 
at least partially offset by the stability benefits of the target consolidating 
with a larger, more stable firm.182 Community bank subsidies, therefore, do 
not necessarily enhance underserved areas’ long-term access to credit.183 
 
 177 See Levitin, Rising Regulatory Compliance Costs, supra note 119, at 63; Jeremy C. Kress, Solving 
Banking’s ‘Too Big to Manage’ Problem, 104 MINN. L. REV. 171, 213–15 (2019) (advocating for forced 
divestitures by too-big-to-manage banks). 
 178 See Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 298–300; Newell, supra note 22, at 9–12. Data on community 
bank consolidation are mixed. On one hand, FDIC statistics indicate that the number of rural American 
counties with physical access to a local bank office that practices relational lending has not declined. See 
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 157, at 2. On the other hand, the number of banks headquartered 
in rural communities appears to be declining due to consolidation. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RSRV. SYS., PERSPECTIVES FROM MAIN STREET: BANK BRANCH ACCESS IN RURAL COMMUNITIES 3 
(2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/bank-branch-access-in-rural-communities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7UK-GZKC] (noting that more than 100 rural banking markets went from containing 
at least one bank’s headquarters to no bank headquarters between 2012 and 2017). 
 179 Consolidation over the past decade has primarily consisted of the acquisition of the smallest 
community banks by other, slightly larger community banks. See Michelle W. Bowman, Member, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the 2019 Community Banking Research and Policy 
Conference: Advancing Our Understanding of Community Banking 4 (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/bowman20191001a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UYE-CE62]; see 
also Michal Kowalik, Troy Davig, Charles S. Morris & Kristen Regehr, Bank Consolidation and Merger 
Activity Following the Crisis, 100 FED. RSRV. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., no. 1, 2015, at 31, 35 
(describing the characteristics of acquired banks); Adam R. Lewis, North Carolina Community Banks: 
Survival Strategies for Turbulent Times, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 349–51 (2013) (articulating the 
benefits of community bank mergers). 
 180 See Bowman, supra note 179, at 9. 
 181 See id.; Jeremy C. Kress, Modernizing Bank Merger Review, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 459–60 
(2020). 
 182 Bowman, supra note 179, at 5–6; Kowalik et al., supra note 179, at 45. When the acquiring 
community banks continue to operate their target’s former branches, therefore, borrowers in economically 
vulnerable communities retain access to relational lending, but now through more stable and sophisticated 
banks.  
 183 Moreover, to the extent that community bank consolidation has undesirable consequences for 
underbanked areas, these effects could be addressed through more effective bank-merger oversight, 
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Third, the claim that a level playing field—without subsidies—would 
expose community banks to competitive pressures and threaten the supply 
of relational lending rests on a misconception. The legal scholarship 
repeatedly insists that “[c]ommunity banks have compiled a superior record 
of meeting the needs of their customers while maintaining a stable business 
model.”184 But in a market economy, superior business models do not 
succumb to competitive pressures; they are the source of those pressures on 
inferior models. If there is special value added from relational lending 
services—and there is good reason to believe that is the case185—then firms 
that provide those services will be able to sustain market share and turn a 
profit without subsidization. That basic economic intuition is consistent with 
data on community banks’ financial performance surveyed above, which 
confirm that their business model continues to compete quite well.186 
Legal scholars’ entreaties to subsidize community banks are therefore 
unpersuasive. Artificially propping up the community bank sector is not a 
viable solution to the too-big-to-fail problem. Nor are community bank 
subsidies essential to protect underbanked areas or to preserve access to 
relational lending services. Calls to further subsidize community banks 
therefore suffer from the same analytical deficiencies as the movement to 
deregulate them. 
 
*          *          * 
 
 
instead of subsidies. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Warren and Representative García Announce 
Introduction of the Bank Merger Review Modernization Act to End Rubber Stamping of Bank Merger 
Applications (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-
and-representative-garca-announce-introduction-of-the-bank-merger-review-modernization-act-to-end-
rubber-stamping-of-bank-merger-applications [https://perma.cc/TUF2-WHRX] (proposing that, among 
other requirements, bank-merger applicants enter enforceable community benefits plans to mitigate 
harmful consequences in underserved areas). 
 184 Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 255, 289, 299 (asserting that customer satisfaction is higher at 
community banks); see also Spivey, supra note 171, at 127 (discussing the advantages of relational 
lending for small businesses and communities). Professor Wilmarth touts the stability of community 
banks, while nonetheless noting that 450 such institutions failed during the financial crisis. Wilmarth, 
supra note 22, at 254. Part of that collapse, Wilmarth argues, was due to community banks’ heavy 
investment in risky commercial real estate loans, which experienced a “sudden” and “disastrous” collapse 
in 2007. Id. at 279–80. 
 185 See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Lamont K. Black, Bank Size, Lending Technologies, and Small 
Business Finance, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 724, 735 (2011) (discussing the advantages of relational lending 
by small banks). 
 186 One possible exception may be banks that have stagnated at the very smallest size threshold. See 
supra Section I.A.1; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, community banks do not necessitate special legal treatment. 
Notwithstanding the weak justifications for community bank deregulation, 
however, policymakers have eagerly taken up the cause. As the next Part 
explains, recent ill-conceived community bank regulatory rollbacks are 
likely to undermine community banks’ safety and soundness and amplify the 
too-many-to-fail problem. 
III. THE MISGUIDED DEREGULATION OF COMMUNITY BANKS 
Even before the initial wave of post-financial crisis reforms had been 
fully implemented, policymakers embarked on a campaign to alleviate 
purported regulatory burdens on community banks. These efforts culminated 
in 2018 with the EGRRCPA and related deregulatory initiatives.187 Among 
other things, Congress and the federal financial agencies weakened 
community bank capital rules, liquidity requirements, and supervisory 
oversight. At the time, few policymakers questioned the wisdom of these 
rollbacks. To the contrary, legislators from across the political spectrum 
supported looser restrictions on community banks.188 These policymakers 
failed to appreciate, however, the potential systemic risks associated with 
deregulating smaller depository institutions. 
This Part contends that the EGGRCPA and associated regulatory 
rollbacks will increase financial stability risks in four ways. First, community 
banks are now free to invest in more volatile assets because the EGGRCPA 
exempts them from risk-based capital requirements and the Volcker Rule. 
Second, smaller depository institutions may now rely on more runnable 
funding sources due to reforms that weaken longstanding restrictions on 
risky brokered deposits. Third, supervisors will be less likely to detect unsafe 
practices because of relaxed community bank oversight. Finally, private 
equity funds, hedge funds, and other institutional investors are likely to take 
advantage of looser corporate governance restrictions to steer community 
banks toward riskier business strategies. Taken together, these legal changes 
will exacerbate the fragility of the community bank sector and hasten another 
too-many-to-fail crisis. 
A. Riskier Assets 
One of the primary consequences of recent regulatory rollbacks is that 
community banks will be free to invest in riskier and more volatile assets. 
 
 187 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
 188 See, e.g., Rebeca Romero Rainey, Opinion, Community Banks a Bipartisan Touchstone for New 
Congress, HILL (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:20 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/417373-
community-banks-a-bipartisan-touchstone-for-new-congress [https://perma.cc/XU5C-QWA7]. 
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New statutory exemptions from two fundamental postcrisis reforms—Basel 
III’s risk-based capital requirements and the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on 
speculative investments—remove important constraints on community 
banks’ investment portfolios. This Section examines each of these reforms 
in turn. 
1. Community Bank Leverage Ratio 
The most significant way Congress and the regulatory agencies have 
relaxed community bank regulation is by dramatically overhauling the 
capital requirements that apply to such firms. Community banks have long 
urged policymakers to simplify post-financial crisis capital rules that they 
insist are excessively complicated.189 By completely eliminating risk-based 
capital requirements for most community banks, however, the EGRRCPA 
goes far beyond the modest changes that the small-bank lobby proposed. 
This sweeping rollback is unwarranted because it will incentivize 
community banks to make excessively risky investments to a degree that 
cannot be justified by any compliance-cost rationale. 
Traditionally, U.S. banks have been subject to two different types of 
capital standards: (1) a leverage ratio, and (2) risk-based capital 
requirements.190 The leverage ratio is the more straightforward of the two 
rules. A bank calculates its leverage ratio by simply dividing its capital by 
its total assets.191 Historically, a minimum leverage ratio has been the 
dominant policy tool for assessing U.S. banks’ capital adequacy, with the 
first federal leverage requirement dating back to the 1930s.192 Today, U.S. 
banks must maintain a ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets of at least 4%.193 
 
 189 See infra notes 200–202 and accompanying text. 
 190 In general, bank capital is analogous to equity. See BARR ET AL., supra note 62, at 265–67. Thus, 
the more capital that a bank maintains, the less likely it is to become insolvent and inflict losses on 
depositors, other creditors, and the banking system as a whole. See id. Banks, however, typically prefer 
to fund themselves with debt, which receives more favorable tax treatment and other legal advantages 
compared to equity. Cf. Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not 
Socially Expensive 19–21 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 161, 2013), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/311031 [https://perma.cc/3BC5-
K5DA] (noting that debt is cheaper than equity because of tax subsidies). As a result, banks favor lower 
capital requirements to minimize their funding costs while maximizing their shareholders’ return on 
equity. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 97–99 (2013) (challenging the validity of banks’ claims that 
“higher capital requirements would ‘greatly diminish growth’”). 
 191 See BARR ET AL., supra note 62, at 280. 
 192 See id. at 267 
 193 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.10(a)(1)(iv), 217.10(b)(4), 324.10(b)(4) (2019). Tier 1 capital consists of common 
stock, retained earnings, paid-in capital, and certain hybrid securities. See id. §§ 3.20(b)–(c), 217.20(b)–
(c), 324.20(b)–(c). 
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Since the adoption of the first Basel Accord (Basel I) in 1988, the 
United States has required its banks to satisfy risk-based capital standards in 
addition to the leverage requirement. A risk-based capital ratio differs from 
a leverage ratio in that banks must risk-weight their assets, with investments 
perceived as more volatile receiving a higher weight.194 Accordingly, banks 
that hold riskier assets must maintain commensurately more capital to meet 
minimum risk-based capital requirements. In 2013, the United States 
implemented Basel III, which strengthened the precrisis risk-based capital 
framework and increased the amount of capital banks must maintain.195 
Among other Basel III requirements, U.S. regulators now mandate that 
domestic banks maintain a ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets of at 
least 6%.196 
Risk-based capital and leverage requirements work in tandem to ensure 
that a bank maintains an appropriate cushion against unexpected losses.197 A 
risk-based approach requires that banks with higher-risk profiles maintain 
bigger capital cushions than banks that invest primarily in safer assets. In 
isolation, however, risk-based capital standards allow banks to “game the 
system” by selectively investing in the riskiest assets within each risk-weight 
category.198 A simple leverage ratio is typically viewed as a backstop to risk-
based capital requirements that prevents firms from engaging in this sort of 
regulatory arbitrage.199 Thus, risk-based capital and leverage requirements 
work together as a belt-and-suspenders approach to ensure bank safety and 
soundness. 
 
 194 For example, under Basel I’s relatively rudimentary risk-weights, a U.S. Treasury bond was risk-
weighted at 0%, while a commercial loan was risk-weighted at 100%. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 
17–18 (1988), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK8S-6Q7Y]. For further 
background on risk-based capital requirements, see Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by 
Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 650–56 (2012). 
 195 See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed. Reg. 
62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
 196 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.10(a)(ii), 217.10(a)(ii), 324.10(a)(ii). Banks also must maintain a common equity 
tier 1 capital ratio of at least 4.5% and a total capital ratio of at least 8%. See id. §§ 3.10(a)(i), (iii), 
217.10(a)(i), (iii), 324.10(a)(i)–(iii). 
 197 See Matthew C. Turk, Overlapping Legal Rules in Financial Regulation and the Administrative 
State, 54 GA. L. REV. 791, 830, 836–37 (2020). 
 198 See id.; see also Aaron D. Klein, Risk Weights or Leverage Ratio? We Need Both, AM. BANKER 
(Dec. 20, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/risk-weights-or-leverage-ratio-we-
need-both [https://perma.cc/E3J9-C4WT] (discussing strengths and weaknesses of risk-based capital 
standards relative to leverage rules). 
 199 See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 265–68 (2008). 
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Community banks have frequently objected to this two-pronged 
approach—particularly the Basel III risk-based capital requirements—on the 
ground that the new capital framework is excessively complex for smaller 
institutions.200 Policymakers have been receptive to these complaints. 
According to FDIC Chairwoman Jelena McWilliams, for example, the 
“Basel III standards . . . are unduly complex and unnecessary for community 
banks.”201 Thus, soon after Basel III’s implementation, ICBA recommended 
that policymakers should replace the new risk-based capital standards for 
community banks with the simpler Basel I framework.202 
In response, Congress substantially overhauled community bank capital 
requirements in the EGRRCPA. In doing so, however, lawmakers went 
considerably further than restoring the Basel I risk-based capital 
requirements, as ICBA had recommended. Instead, § 201 of the EGRRCPA 
establishes a community bank leverage ratio (CBLR) to be set between 8% 
and 10% at the federal bank regulators’ discretion.203 The EGRRCPA also 
states that a bank with less than $10 billion in total assets will be considered 
to have met all applicable leverage and risk-based capital requirements if it 
exceeds the CBLR.204 Thus, the EGRRCPA effectively eliminates all risk-
based capital requirements for community banks that satisfy the CBLR. The 
federal banking agencies set the CBLR at 9% in late 2019.205 
 
 200 The ICBA, for example, contended that complicated Basel III risk-based capital requirements 
“harm[] the consumers and businesses that rely on community bank credit.” Bank Capital and Liquidity 
Regulations Part II: Industry Perspectives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. 
Affs., 114th Cong. 28 (2016) [hereinafter Bank Capital Hearing] (prepared statement of Rebeca Romero 
Rainey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Centinel Bank of Taos). One community bank executive 
testified that his firm hired two separate commercial vendors to assign risk-weights to its investments and 
spent up to fifty hours per quarter reconciling differences between the two providers. See Legislative 
Proposals for a More Efficient Federal Financial Regulatory Regime: Part III: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 67 (2018) 
(statement of Robert M. Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tioga State Bank) [hereinafter 
Fisher Testimony]. 
 201 Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Thirteenth Annual Community Bankers Symposium: Back to Basics (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.fdic. 
gov/news/news/speeches/spnov1618.html [https://perma.cc/V8R7-MZAE]. 
 202 See Bank Capital Hearing, supra note 200, at 4 (statement of Rebeca Romero Rainey, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer, Centinel Bank of Taos). 
 203 See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
§ 201(b), 132 Stat. 1296, 1306 (2018) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371(b) (Capital Simplification for 
Qualifying Community Banks)). 
 204 See id. § 201(a)(3), (c). 
 205 See Regulatory Capital Rule: Capital Simplification for Qualifying Community Banking 
Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 61776 (Nov. 13, 2019) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) 
[hereinafter CBLR Final Rule]. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress temporarily reduced 
the CBLR to 8% until the earlier of: (1) the termination of the national emergency declaration related to 
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Proponents of the CBLR assert that eliminating risk-based capital 
requirements will ease regulatory burden on community banks. They claim, 
for example, that small banks that lack the expertise to calculate their own 
risk-based capital ratios will no longer need to hire outside consultants to 
assign risk-weights to their assets.206 Moreover, according to FDIC Chairman 
McWilliams, community banks will be able to demonstrate compliance with 
the CBLR by completing just one page of regulatory reporting, compared to 
fifteen pages for risk-based capital requirements.207 Thus, the primary 
rationale for the CBLR is grounded in easing the administrative burden on 
community banks. 
In their effort to provide community banks regulatory relief, however, 
policymakers failed to appreciate how the CBLR framework undermines the 
safety and soundness of community banks that opt in to it. When subject only 
to a leverage requirement, a community bank’s investments are treated 
identically for regulatory capital purposes, regardless of their underlying risk 
profile. As former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo explained, 
“[W]ith the constraints of risk-based capital . . . lifted, [banks will] be 
strongly incentivized to change the composition of their balance sheets 
dramatically, shedding safer and more liquid assets like Treasuries in 
exchange for riskier but higher-yielding assets.”208 It is for precisely this 
reason that policymakers originally supplemented the leverage ratio 
requirement with risk-based capital requirements in the 1980s.209 
In response to the CBLR, therefore, community banks are likely to 
increase their risk profiles in an effort to generate higher returns. Post-
financial crisis regulation has demonstrated that financial assets migrate to 
 
the COVID-19 pandemic, or (2) December 31, 2020. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4012, 134 Stat. 281, 479 (2020). The financial regulatory agencies issued an 
interim final rule outlining a transition back to a 9% CBLR by January 1, 2022. See Regulatory Capital 
Rule: Transition for the Community Bank Leverage Ratio Framework, 85 Fed. Reg. 22930 (Apr. 23, 
2020) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
 206 See supra note 200. 
 207 Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, FDIC, Oversight of Prudential Regulators: Ensuring the Safety, 
Soundness, and Accountability of Megabanks and Other Depository Institutions (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay1619.html [https://perma.cc/32KT-TUGX]. 
 208 Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Departing Thoughts: Speech 
at the Woodrow Wilson School 11–12 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/files/tarullo20170404a.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY5R-B6W5]; see also Mike Konczal, Why 
Banking Leverage Requirements Are Not Enough, ROOSEVELT INST., (Mar. 16, 2017), https:// 
rooseveltinstitute.org/why_we_need_both_capital_requirements/ [https://perma.cc/K3LM-EUER] 
(noting that, in the absence of risk-based capital standards, a leverage requirement incentivizes banks to 
invest in riskier assets). 
 209 See Tarullo, supra note 208, at 11–12. 
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institutions where they are subject to comparatively lower capital charges.210 
This dynamic will likely accelerate following the implementation of the 
CBLR, as community banks invest in risky assets that would be subject to 
high capital charges if held by banks that are subject to risk-based capital 
requirements. 
Moreover, contrary to some claims, it is unlikely that increased risk-
taking occasioned by the CBLR will be offset by higher overall capital levels 
among community banks. CBLR proponents insist that the new leverage 
ratio will make community banks safer by elevating the total amount of 
capital in the banking system.211 Since the 9% CBLR exceeds the tier 1 
leverage ratio of 4%, supporters assume that community banks will need to 
maintain more capital in order to qualify for the exemption from risk-based 
capital requirements.212 However, this assumption is inaccurate. The vast 
majority of community banks have traditionally maintained leverage ratios 
well above the 4% minimum in order to satisfy risk-based capital 
requirements that are more stringent than the leverage ratio backstop. Indeed, 
the federal banking agencies estimate that 85% percent of eligible 
community banks already maintain a tier 1 leverage ratio greater than 9% 
and therefore will not need to raise capital in order to take advantage of the 
CBLR.213 Thus, while the 9% CBLR strengthens the leverage requirement 
for community banks, in practice, the elimination of risk-based requirements 
may nonetheless allow small banks to take on greater overall balance sheet 
risk without commensurately increasing their capital. 
In sum, moving to a solely leverage-based capital regime will 
incentivize community banks to invest in higher-yielding—and therefore 
riskier—assets. The push to eliminate community banks’ risk-based capital 
requirements in the EGRRCPA, however, ignored this likely outcome. Thus, 
 
 210 See, e.g., John Heltman, Regulators Need More Tools to Keep System Safe: Boston Fed Chief, 
AM. BANKER (July 15, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-need-more-
tools-to-keep-system-safe-boston-fed-chief [https://perma.cc/6WWB-WF6G] (noting that commercial 
real estate has migrated from big banks subject to the Federal Reserve’s stress tests to smaller banks that 
are not subject to such tests). For further discussion of the regulatory arbitrage phenomenon, see infra 
Section I.A. 
 211 Cf. Press Release, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., ICBA Statement on Community Bank Leverage 
Ratio (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.icba.org/news/icba-in-the-news/2018/11/20/icba-statement-on-
community-bank-leverage-ratio [https://perma.cc/LM25-B9XZ] (“[The proposed CBLR] would be well 
over the 5 percent leverage ratio requirement currently required of all well-capitalized banks and 
significantly higher than next year’s requirement of 7 percent common equity over total risk-based 
assets . . . .”); Letter from Sen. Mike Crapo et al., to Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (July 30, 2019), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Otting% 
20McWilliams%20Letter%207-30-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3R-24LM] (“The proposed 9 percent 
CBLR is well above the current Tier 1 leverage requirement for well-capitalized banks.”).  
 212 See supra note 211.  
 213 See CBLR Final Rule, supra note 205, at 61784. 
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while the CBLR simplifies the capital regime, it does so at the expense of 
community banks’ safety and soundness. 
2. The Volcker Rule 
A second way in which the EGGRCPA permits community banks to 
invest in riskier assets is by exempting them from the Volcker Rule. 
Congress originally adopted the Volcker Rule to prevent banks and bank 
holding companies (BHCs) from using insured deposits to speculate in 
financial markets. By exempting small firms from the Volcker Rule, 
policymakers have now unwisely exposed the community bank sector to 
renewed risk-taking. 
Enacted in 2010 as one of the centerpieces of Dodd-Frank, the Volcker 
Rule sought to eliminate speculative trading activities from the regulated 
banking sector. As the chief architect of the rule, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker, warned Congress, “[I]f banking institutions . . . are 
given free rein to speculate, I may not live long enough to see the crisis, but 
my soul is going to come back and haunt you.”214 Heeding Volcker’s 
warning, Congress adopted the Volcker Rule, which contains two 
substantive prohibitions.215 First, the Volcker Rule bars banks and BHCs 
from engaging in proprietary trading—using the firm’s funds to buy or sell 
financial instruments for its trading account.216 Second, the Volcker Rule 
restricts these institutions from investing in or sponsoring hedge funds and 
private equity funds that would effectively undertake the same activities.217 
As originally adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act, these prohibitions applied to 
all banks and BHCs, regardless of size. 
Upon Dodd-Frank’s enactment, community banks argued that applying 
the Volcker Rule to small banks was unnecessary because they generally do 
not engage in proprietary trading or invest in covered funds.218 Community 
banks also claimed that the Volcker Rule imposed significant regulatory 
costs because they would have to hire consultants and lawyers to 
 
 214 Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 28 (2010) (statement of Paul 
A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.). 
 215 For background on the Volcker Rule, see S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, 
Eliminating Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker Rule, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 
343, 363–68 (2018), and Ryan Bubb & Marcel Kahan, Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the 
Volcker Rule, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1023–28 (2018). 
 216 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A), (h)(4). 
 217 Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B). 
 218 See Butz, supra note 22, at 465. 
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demonstrate compliance with the rule.219 Eventually, even some Dodd-Frank 
supporters—including Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo—
concluded that community banks should not be covered by the Volcker 
Rule.220 
In response to this pressure, Congress exempted community banks from 
the Volcker Rule in the EGRRCPA. As amended by the EGRRCPA, the 
Volcker Rule does not apply to a bank or BHC with $10 billion or less in 
total consolidated assets, as long as the firm’s trading assets and trading 
liabilities are less than 5% of its total assets.221 The federal banking agencies 
finalized corresponding amendments to the Volcker Rule’s implementing 
regulations in mid-2019.222 
While the community bank exemption might appear innocuous, 
removing the Volcker Rule’s constraints is likely to lead to escalating risks 
within the community bank sector. To be sure, few community banks 
engaged in proprietary trading or invested in hedge funds and private equity 
funds before Dodd-Frank.223 But as the financial sector equilibrates in the 
post-EGRRCPA regulatory environment, community banks now hold a 
unique regulatory permit to engage in those activities, which are off-limits 
to bigger banks. The precrisis landscape is therefore misleading. The 
dynamic effect of the Volcker Rule exemption will be to encourage at least 
some community banks to engage in speculative activity, even if they did not 
before the Volcker Rule was enacted.224 
In practice, the EGRRCPA’s Volcker Rule exemption permits 
community banks to amass significant risks in two ways. First, even though 
Congress capped community banks’ trading exposures at 5% of their 
 
 219 See Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regul. Counsel, Indep. Cmty. 
Bankers of Am., to Legis. & Regul. Activities Div., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency 2 (Sept. 19, 
2017), https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/letters-to-regulators/2017/ 
cl091917.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7SM-VTNM]. Although the financial regulatory agencies tried to tailor 
the rule’s requirements for community banks to limit compliance costs, these accommodations did not 
fully alleviate the burden. See Tarullo, supra note 208, at 8 (“While the regulatory agencies have tried to 
tailor the rules so as to avoid burdening [community] banks, even the process of figuring out that the rules 
do not constrain them is a compliance cost . . . .”). 
 220 See Tarullo, supra note 208, at 7 (“[T]he Volcker rule applies to a much broader group of banks 
than is necessary to achieve its purpose . . . . [T]he concerns underlying the Volcker rule are simply not 
an issue at community banks.”). 
 221 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1)(B). 
 222 Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 35008 (July 22, 2019) (codified 
in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R. and 17 C.F.R.). 
 223 See Peirce et al., supra note 104, at 45 (noting that only 0.6% of community banks modified their 
activities in response to the Volcker Rule).  
 224 For more on the regulatory arbitrage phenomenon, see infra Section I.A. 
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assets,225 this limitation still permits a significant amount of proprietary 
trading. Indeed, 5% of assets exceeds the minimum leverage ratio 
requirement for community banks that do not opt in to the CBLR.226 Thus, as 
a result of the EGRRCPA, a community bank may now invest an amount 
equal to its entire equity cushion in potentially volatile financial assets that 
are forbidden to larger banks.227 
The second way in which the Volcker Rule exemption exposes 
community banks to increasing risk is by allowing such firms to make 
unlimited investments in hedge funds and private equity funds. Although the 
EGRRCPA capped community banks’ trading exposures at 5% of total 
assets, policymakers did not limit community banks’ investments in hedge 
funds or private equity funds.228 In many respects, this loophole eviscerates 
the 5% limit on trading exposures because hedge funds’ sole function is to 
engage in proprietary trading. Several law firms have already begun 
encouraging community banks to exploit this loophole by investing in 
previously prohibited funds,229 even though such funds tend to specialize in 
highly volatile asset markets, do not have an impressive financial track 
record, and therefore threaten to impose significant losses on the banks that 
invest in them.230 
In sum, there are reasons to believe that releasing smaller firms from 
the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions could contribute to escalating risks in the 
community bank sector. When rolling back the Volcker Rule, policymakers 
focused exclusively on the benefits of the reducing compliance burden on 
community banks. What they missed, however, is that proprietary trading 
and investments in hedge funds and private equity funds will likely migrate 
 
 225 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1)(B). 
 226 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 227 Moreover, as FDIC Board Member and former Chairman Martin Gruenberg noted, the 5% 
limitation on trading account assets is not a meaningful constraint, since “a bank can engage in proprietary 
trading from its available-for-sale account as easily as it can from its trading account.” Martin J. 
Gruenberg, Member, FDIC, Statement at Meeting of the FDIC Board of Directors: Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Volcker Rule Small Bank Exemption 2 (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/ 
speeches/spdec1818a.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHA3-3UGS]. 
 228 See id. (arguing that the 5% trading-exposure limit has minimal practical effect because 
community banks may still invest in hedge funds and private equity funds). 
 229 See DEBORAH J. ENEA, JONATHAN D. HAMMOND & ELIZABETH R. GLOWACKI, TROUTMAN 
PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP, FINAL VOLCKER RULE REGULATION EASES HEDGE FUND AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUND RESTRICTIONS 4 (2019), https://www.troutman.com/print/content/37314/Final-
Volcker-Rule-Regulation-Eases-Hedge-Fund-And-Private-Equity-Fund-Restrictions.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BN7U-XLUQ] (“[T]he increased scope and flexibility in trading activities [that community 
banks] now have will make them attractive partners in private equity funds and hedge funds . . . .”). 
 230 See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 45, at 185–218 (discussing collapse of hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management). 
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to community banks now that such conduct is permissible only for smaller 
firms. As a result of the Volcker Rule exemption, therefore, community 
banks will be increasingly exposed to these volatile investments. 
B. More Volatile Funding 
In addition to relaxing restrictions on community banks’ investments, 
policymakers have also eased limits on their use of risky funding sources. 
Traditionally, U.S. banks faced restrictions on the extent to which they could 
accept funds from deposit brokers—intermediaries that facilitate the 
placement of account-holders’ money with insured depository institutions.231 
The EGRRCPA, however, allows community banks to rely increasingly on 
brokered deposits, despite evidence that such funds are uniquely prone to 
withdrawal during a crisis.232 These reforms will render community banks 
more susceptible to destabilizing runs by their creditors. 
U.S. banks fund themselves primarily with deposits, but the nature of a 
bank’s deposits may vary dramatically. The most common type of 
deposits—core deposits—come from a bank’s local customers who have a 
borrowing relationship with the bank.233 Core deposits are subject to the 
FDIC deposit insurance limit—currently $250,000 per customer, per bank.234 
Since the 1960s, however, deposit brokers have helped businesses and high-
net-worth individuals spread their accounts among multiple banks in order 
to maximize their deposit insurance protection and obtain higher interest 
rates.235 Thereafter, a new subset of brokered deposits soon emerged, called 
reciprocal deposits, in which banks form a network to trade high-dollar 
deposits among themselves—with the help of a broker—so that their 
customers receive insurance coverage on the entire amount of their 
deposits.236 By 2018, nearly $1 trillion—or 8% of the total deposits in U.S. 
banks—had been placed through deposit brokers.237 
 
 231 See FDIC, STUDY ON CORE DEPOSITS AND BROKERED DEPOSITS 6–7 (2011) [hereinafter 
BROKERED DEPOSIT STUDY], https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/coredeposit-
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV4F-XKX9]. 
 232 See id. at 47–48 (summarizing evidence of risks associated with brokered deposits). 
 233 See id. at 5; see also Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices: Brokered Deposits and Interest Rate 
Restrictions, 84 Fed. Reg. 2366, 2377–78 (proposed Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Brokered Deposit 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. 
 234 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (providing that the FDIC shall insure depositors up to $250,000 per 
ownership account category, per depositor, per institution). 
 235 See Brokered Deposit Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 233, at 2368. 
 236 See id. at 2368–69. 
 237 Id. at 2379 (listing these data points as of September 30, 2018). 
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In response to this trend, policymakers have limited banks’ ability to 
accept brokered deposits. Critics warn that banks might use brokered 
deposits to grow rapidly and without adequate risk controls, as some firms 
did in the lead-up to the 1980s S&L crisis.238 Moreover, policymakers fear 
that brokered deposits are more volatile than core deposits, because 
customers without a direct relationship to a bank might be more likely to 
withdraw their funds when they become aware of problems at the bank or 
when they find a better interest rate offered elsewhere.239 As a result, 
Congress established the first restrictions on brokered deposits in 1989.240 
Today, a bank that does not satisfy minimum capital requirements is 
prohibited from accepting brokered deposits, and a bank that is not “well 
capitalized” may take brokered deposits only if it obtains a waiver from the 
FDIC.241 In addition, a bank must pay higher deposit insurance premiums if 
brokered deposits comprise more than 10% of its total deposits.242 
Community banks have long argued that these restrictions on brokered 
deposits are excessive and are particularly disadvantageous for small banks. 
One reason is that brokered deposits can be a relatively cheap way to fund 
asset growth compared to accepting deposits through brick-and-mortar 
branches.243 Community banks have been particularly critical of limitations 
on reciprocal deposits, which they view as an essential tool to compete with 
larger firms for funding.244 
 
 238 See BROKERED DEPOSIT STUDY, supra note 231, at 15 (discussing use of brokered deposits in the 
S&L crisis). 
 239 Brokered Deposit Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 233, at 2366; BROKERED 
DEPOSIT STUDY, supra note 231, at 48, 50–51. 
 240 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
§ 224, 103 Stat. 183, 273–75 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f). 
 241 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a), (c). 
 242 See 12 C.F.R. § 327.9(d)(3) (2020). 
 243 See Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regul. Counsel, Indep. Cmty. 
Bankers of Am., to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 7 (May 7, 2019), 
https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/letters-to-regulators/19-05-07_ 
brokereddepositcl.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LRH-35G4] (“Brokered deposits can be a stable source of 
funding and a cost-effective way for community banks to meet their funding needs.”). 
 244 See Victoria Guida, Why Congress Wants to Skirt the Limits on Federal Deposit Insurance, 
POLITICO (Apr. 8, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/08/banks-federal-deposit-
insurance-463705 [https://perma.cc/8YBY-M5ZG] (noting community banks’ view that reciprocal 
deposits help them level the competitive playing field with the largest banks). Specifically, community 
banks pleaded with policymakers to permit small firms to rely more heavily on reciprocal deposits, 
claiming that reciprocal deposits are less likely than nonreciprocal brokered deposits to flee during a 
crisis. See id. (“[P]roponents of reciprocal deposits . . . say they shouldn’t be considered brokered deposits 
because they pose less risk.”). 
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As part of the recent deregulatory push, policymakers have now 
significantly liberalized decades-old limitations on brokered deposits. Most 
notably, in the EGRRCPA, Congress exempted reciprocal deposits from the 
definition of brokered deposits, thereby freeing banks to participate in 
interbank deposit-sharing networks without regard to their capital levels and 
without affecting their deposit insurance assessment rates.245 This reform is 
most relevant to community banks, which rely on reciprocal deposits to a 
much greater extent than larger competitors.246 In addition to this legislative 
relief, the FDIC proposed in late 2019 to further relax its brokered deposits 
regulation by exempting certain brokers and the deposits they manage.247 The 
FDIC framed these exemptions as an effort to help smaller banks.248 
Despite claims that loosening rules on brokered deposits will help 
community banks, these reforms will in fact expose smaller firms to new 
funding vulnerabilities. For example, a 2011 FDIC study concluded that 
greater reliance on brokered deposits is associated with higher probability of 
bank failure.249 The same study demonstrated that, controlling for bank size, 
firms with more brokered deposits inflict bigger losses on the FDIC’s 
insurance fund when they collapse.250 Moreover, brokered deposits may be 
 
 245 See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
§ 202(a), 132 Stat. 1296, 1307–08 (2018) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(i)(1)). The reciprocal deposit 
exemption is capped at the lesser of $5 billion per bank or 20% of the bank’s total liabilities. Id. 
 246 See Brokered Deposit Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 233, at 2382 chart 
7 (demonstrating that reciprocal deposits constituted a significantly higher percentage of brokered 
deposits at smaller banks compared to larger banks). 
 247 See Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices: Brokered Deposits Restrictions, 85 Fed. Reg. 7453, 
7458–59 (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2019/2019-12-12-notice-dis-b-fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4NGB-FSGJ] (proposing to expand the exception for brokers whose primary purpose 
is not the placement of funds with depository institutions). According to FDIC Board Member and former 
Chairman Martin Gruenberg, “While we cannot with confidence estimate the amount of deposits that 
could qualify for this exception, it seems likely to be large . . . .” Martin J. Gruenberg, Member, FDIC, 
Statement at Meeting of the FDIC Board of Directors: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Brokered 
Deposits 6 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spdec1219c.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GX8R-NVHX]. 
 248 See Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, FDIC, Keynote Remarks at the Brookings Institution: 
Brokered Deposits in the Fintech Age 6 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/ 
spdec1119.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBF2-BYP9] (“[M]any banks located in low-income areas . . . depend 
on deposits sourced from outside their local areas for funding. The changes we are considering to the 
brokered deposits regulation are intended to help such . . . firms.”). 
 249 BROKERED DEPOSIT STUDY, supra note 231, at 3, 38–42, 47–48. Although reciprocal deposits 
might not be as risky as nonreciprocal brokered deposits, the FDIC found that reciprocal deposits pose 
more risk than core deposits. See id. at 44–46. 
 250 See id. at 3, 42. During the 2008 financial crisis, nearly fifty banks that relied heavily on brokered 
deposits failed. While these institutions held assets representing 13% of all banks that failed in the crisis, 
they accounted for 38% of losses to the FDIC’s insurance fund during that period. See Brokered Deposit 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 233, at 2370. 
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particularly risky when banks use them to fund volatile or illiquid assets—
such as those incentivized by the CBLR and authorized by the Volcker Rule 
exemption—which can trigger fire sales when creditors unexpectedly 
withdraw funding.251 Similar concerns were in part what originally spurred 
policymakers to restrict brokered deposits in the 1980s.252 Nonetheless, the 
recent efforts to weaken brokered deposit restrictions have largely ignored 
this downside risk.253 
In sum, brokered deposit reforms will allow community banks to rely 
on riskier sources of funding, thereby making them more vulnerable to 
financial distress. In lieu of stable, core deposits, more community banks will 
now be able to accept volatile brokered and reciprocal deposits through 
interbank deposit-sharing networks, despite evidence that these deposits flee 
quickly in times of crisis. These changes are especially worrisome when 
paired with reforms like the CBLR and the Volcker Rule exemption, which 
at the same time allow community banks to invest in riskier assets. 
C. Relaxed Supervision 
In addition to weakening community bank regulation, policymakers 
have also curtailed supervision of such firms by federal bank examiners. 
Traditionally, banks of all sizes have been subject to periodic reporting 
requirements and on-site examinations to verify their compliance with 
banking laws and regulations.254 In the last several years, however, Congress 
and the federal banking agencies have significantly decreased community 
banks’ reporting obligations and examination frequency. These rollbacks 
ignore compelling evidence that looser bank supervision allows banks to take 
inappropriate risks and fail more frequently. 
Supervision is the process by which government authorities oversee 
banks. Among other things, supervisors assess whether banks are in sound 
financial condition, obey safety-and-soundness rules, and abide by consumer 
protection requirements.255 Supervision differs from regulation, which is the 
 
 251 Cf. Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: 
Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1471–72 (2019) 
(discussing fire-sale dynamics). 
 252 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 253 See, e.g., Guida, supra note 244 (describing the brokered-deposit reform in the EGRRCPA as a 
“little-noticed provision”). 
 254 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (instructing the federal banking agencies to conduct on-site 
examinations of insured depository institutions); id. at §§ 161(a), 1817(a)–(b) (authorizing the federal 
banking agencies to require insured depository institutions to file periodic reports on their condition). 
 255 See, e.g., Lev Menand, The Monetary Basis of Bank Supervision, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 12–17), https://ssrn.com/a=3421232 [https://perma.cc/346L-J628].  
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process by which government agencies codify applicable rules and 
guidelines.256 Modern bank supervision typically takes two forms.257 First, 
banks are subject to periodic reporting requirements, pursuant to which they 
must disclose information about their financial condition.258 Second, 
supervisory teams conduct intermittent on-site examinations, during which 
they inspect a bank’s books and records, meet with the bank’s management, 
and evaluate the bank’s technology and compliance systems.259 
Community banks have traditionally been subject to less onerous 
supervision than larger banks. The United States’ biggest banks, for 
example, are subject to continuous on-site monitoring, wherein dozens of 
supervisors work full-time from offices within the banks’ headquarters.260 
Mid-size banks, meanwhile, are subject to a twelve-month examination 
cycle, in which a team of supervisors visits each bank once per year to 
conduct an annual safety-and-soundness evaluation.261 Since 1991, however, 
the smallest U.S. banks have been eligible for an extended eighteen-month 
examination cycle.262 As of 2015, community banks with less than $1 billion 
in assets may qualify for this less frequent examination schedule.263 
Community banks are likewise subject to relaxed reporting requirements. 
The regular Call Report—the primary form on which banks report their 
quarterly financial condition—contains eighty-seven pages of required 
data.264 In 2017, however, the financial regulatory agencies began allowing 
 
 256 Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential Financial, 
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 180 (2018) (distinguishing between supervision and regulation). 
 257 See Menand, supra note 255, at 3 & nn.2–3. 
 258 See BARR ET AL., supra note 62, at 899–902. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See Jesse Hamilton, Plan to Stop Banks from Seducing Regulators Dies Under Trump, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-06/plan-to-
prevent-banks-from-seducing-regulators-dies-under-trump [https://perma.cc/M9EW-YGHE]. 
 261 See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1). 
 262 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 
§ 111(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2240–41 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(4)). 
 263 Congress originally set the eligibility threshold for the eighteen-month exam cycle at $100 million 
in assets in 1991. Id. Congress increased the asset threshold to $250 million in 1994, $500 million in 
2006, and $1 billion in 2015. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 306(a)(1), 108 Stat. 2160, 2217; Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 605, 120 Stat. 1966, 1981; Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 83001(1), 129 Stat. 1312, 1796 (2015). 
 264 See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND 
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY—FFIEC 041 (2019), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/ 
FFIEC_forms/FFIEC041_201906_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5MY-KUWZ]. 
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banks with less than $1 billion in assets to file a short-form, sixty-four page 
Call Report to reduce their compliance burden.265 
Community banks have nonetheless asserted that these 
accommodations provide insufficient relief from their oversight burden. In 
particular, community banks with more than $1 billion in assets have urged 
that they should be eligible for an extended examination cycle and short-
form Call Report.266 Community banks with less than $1 billion in assets also 
contended that even the extended examination cycle and short-form Call 
Report imposed significant, unjustifiable compliance costs.267 
In response to these arguments, policymakers have now curtailed 
community bank supervision in several ways. First, Congress expanded the 
field of banks eligible for lighter examination and reporting requirements in 
the EGRRCPA. Congress raised the eligibility threshold for the eighteen-
month examination cycle from $1 billion to $3 billion in assets, 
encompassing approximately 420 additional banks.268 Likewise, Congress 
authorized banks with less than $5 billion in assets to file the short-form Call 
Report in the first and third quarters of each year.269 In addition, the 
 
265 See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND 
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY AND TOTAL ASSETS LESS THAN $1 BILLION—
FFIEC 051 (2019), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC051_201906_f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WFM-ADUZ]; see also Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for 
OMB Review; Joint Comment Request, 82 Fed. Reg. 2444 (Jan. 9, 2017) (adopting the short-form Call 
Report for banks with less than $1 billion in assets). The short-form Call Report removed 950, or roughly 
40%, of the data items in the full-length Call Report, generally relating to complex or specialized 
investments or activities rarely applicable to community banks, such as derivatives, trading assets, and 
securitizations. See Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 
54190, 54191, 54194–98 (Aug. 15, 2016).  
 266 See Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regul. Counsel, Indep. Cmty. 
Bankers of Am., to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 5, 7 (Mar. 21, 
2016), https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/letters-to-regulators/2016/ 
cl032116.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAM2-Q723]. 
 267 For example, some community banks complained that “[p]reparations for bank exams, and the 
exams themselves, distract bank management from serving their communities to their full potential.” 
Letter from Camden R. Fine, President & Chief Exec. Off., Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to John 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives & Nancy Pelosi, Democratic Leader, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/ 
letters-to-congress/2015/ltr100615.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TF9-Z554]. Similarly, the ICBA maintained 
that “[w]hatever negligible value there is for the regulators in obtaining [Call Report data] is dwarfed by 
the expense and the staff hours dedicated to collecting it.” Letter from Camden R. Fine, President & Chief 
Exec. Off., Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to Randy M. Hultgren & Terri A. Sewell, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 10, 2016) (on file with journal). 
 268 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(4); Expanded Examination Cycle for Certain Small Insured Depository 
Institutions and U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, 83 Fed. Reg. 43961, 43963 (Aug. 29, 
2018) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
 269 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(12). 
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regulatory agencies further condensed the short-form Call Report by 
reducing the reporting frequency of 37% of the report’s data items.270 
While these reforms alleviate some burden on community banks, they 
also ignore the potential downsides of looser bank oversight. Numerous 
empirical studies have demonstrated that looser supervision leads to elevated 
risk-taking and more bank failures. One such study analyzed bank 
performance after Congress increased the eligibility threshold for the 
eighteen-month exam cycle to $250 million in 1994 and $500 million in 
2006.271 Exploiting these discontinuities, the authors concluded that banks 
experienced lower returns on equity and higher loan losses when they were 
subject to less frequent on-site examinations.272 Moreover, several studies 
have explored the effect on bank performance when supervisors move their 
offices away from a bank’s headquarters—a proxy for less intense 
supervision. These studies conclude that a reduction in supervisory attention 
is associated with increased bank leverage, riskier investments, more bank 
failures, and higher resolution costs.273 The data therefore suggest that, when 
faced with lighter supervision, banks take more risks and are more prone to 
fail. 
 
 270 Reduced Reporting for Covered Depository Institutions, 84 Fed. Reg. 29039, 29043 (June 21, 
2019) (to be codified at scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). The affected line items generally relate to risk-
weights for regulatory capital calculations, “fiduciary and related services assets and income, and troubled 
debt restructurings.” See id. 
 271 See Marcelo Rezende & Jason J. Wu, The Effects of Supervision on Bank Performance: Evidence 
from Discontinuous Examination Frequencies 3 (Feb. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/a=2135017 [https://perma.cc/S3WZ-ZUQG]. 
 272 See id. at 19; see also Manthos D. Delis & Panagiotis K. Staikouras, Supervisory Effectiveness 
and Bank Risk, 15 REV. FIN. 511, 512, 536 (2011) (finding that bank risk-taking is negatively correlated 
with the frequency of on-site examinations, based on a multicountry study); BEVERLY HIRTLE, ANNA 
KOVNER & MATTHEW PLOSSER, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., THE IMPACT OF SUPERVISION ON BANK 
PERFORMANCE 2, 27–35 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_ 
reports/sr768.html [https://perma.cc/LQB5-XJ9X] (finding that banks receiving less supervisory 
attention hold riskier loan portfolios, are more volatile, and are more sensitive to economic shocks 
compared to other banks). 
 273 See, e.g., John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1–3 (Jan. 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
a=2938039 [https://perma.cc/48KU-YW5L] (concluding that when the Federal Home Loan Bank 
relocated supervisors away from Little Rock, Arkansas, institutions in the affected district increased risky 
real estate investments, grew more rapidly, were more likely to engage in accounting gimmicks, failed 
more frequently, and imposed higher costs on the deposit insurance fund); Yadav Gopalan, Ankit Kalda 
& Asaf Manela, Hub-and-Spoke Regulation and Bank Leverage 2 (Jan. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/a=2849877 [https://perma.cc/3EKX-9GS5] (finding that when the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency closes a field office, the banks nearest to the field office distribute more cash 
to shareholders, increase their leverage, and fail more frequently). 
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With the recent wave of supervisory reforms, however, policymakers 
have effectively ignored these potential adverse consequences of looser 
community bank oversight. While reducing examination frequency and 
reporting requirements will lessen community banks’ administrative burden, 
the trade-off will likely be increased societal costs in the form of excessive 
risk-taking and more frequent bank failures. Efforts to roll back community 
bank supervision are particularly troubling when combined with the 
deregulation of community bank capital, activities, and funding discussed 
above. And these regulatory and supervisory rollbacks are particularly ill-
conceived just a decade after one of the worst too-many-to-fail crises in U.S. 
history. 
D. Weaker Corporate Governance 
In addition to permitting banks to invest in riskier assets, rely on more 
volatile funding, and avoid supervisory scrutiny, policymakers have also 
loosened restrictions on risk-seeking investors who may attempt to persuade 
community banks to adopt riskier strategies. For decades, federal law has 
restricted the level of control certain investors may exert over banks’ 
decision-making.274 The Federal Reserve, however, has significantly relaxed 
those longstanding constraints.275 Newly enacted reforms to the Federal 
Reserve’s “control rule” will permit hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
other outside investors to take bigger ownership interests in banks and 
exercise more influence over their managerial decisions. 
Federal law establishes a regulatory framework governing certain bank 
shareholders. Specifically, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 provides 
that any company that “controls” a bank is a BHC and, accordingly, is 
subject to regulation and supervision by the Federal Reserve.276 This 
provision was designed “to ensure that companies that acquire control of 
banking organizations have the financial and managerial strength, integrity, 
and competence to exercise that control in a safe and sound manner.”277 
Hedge funds, private equity funds, and similar outside investors, however, 
 
 274 See BARR ET AL., supra note 62, at 691–93. 
 275 See Control and Divestiture Proceedings, 85 Fed. Reg. 12398 (Mar. 2, 2020) (codified at scattered 
sections of 12 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Control Rule]. 
 276 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
 277 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and 
Bank Holding Companies 2 (Sept. 22, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bcreg20080922b1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TR8F-FXE3]. 
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perceive BHC regulation as incompatible with their business models.278 As a 
result, these parties often try to structure their ownership stakes in banks as 
noncontrolling investments.279 
The Bank Holding Company Act identifies three circumstances in 
which an investor is deemed to control a bank. Specifically, an investor 
controls a bank—and becomes a BHC—if it: (1) owns or has the power to 
vote 25% or more of any class of the bank’s voting securities, (2) controls 
the election of a majority of the bank’s board of directors, or (3) “directly or 
indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies 
of the bank.”280 The first two criteria are relatively straightforward. The 
nebulous “controlling influence” prong, however, has engendered 
considerable uncertainty among potential investors who are unsure whether 
their ownership interests might constitute control.281 
Traditionally, the Federal Reserve has assessed whether an investor 
exercises a controlling influence over a bank on a case-by-case basis. Among 
other factors, the Federal Reserve considers the size of the investor’s 
ownership interest, the number of board seats the investor controls, and the 
investor’s business relationships with the bank.282 The Federal Reserve 
generally evaluates these criteria on a sliding scale—investors with a 
comparatively high equity stake typically had to limit other indicia of control 
to avoid exercising a controlling influence.283 The Federal Reserve, however, 
has published few clear guidelines on which combinations of these factors 
would trigger control. Accordingly, a potential bank investor often seeks an 
ad hoc noncontrol determination—an assurance from the Federal Reserve 
that, based on the terms of a proposed investment, the investor will not be 
deemed to control the bank.284 
 
 278 See John Coates & David Scharfstein, Lowering the Cost of Bank Recapitalization, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 373, 383–84 (2009); see also David L. Glass, So You Think You Want to Buy a Bank?, 73 ALB. L. 
REV. 447, 451 (2010) (discussing why private equity funds do not want to become BHCs). 
 279 See THOMAS P. VARTANIAN, DAVID L. ANSELL & ROBERT H. LEDIG, THE BANK INVESTOR’S 
SURVIVAL GUIDE: A GUIDE FOR PRIVATE EQUITY, HEDGE FUND, MUTUAL FUND & ACTIVIST INVESTORS 
TO NAVIGATE U.S. FEDERAL BANK INVESTMENT RULES 6 (2016). 
 280 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2). 
 281 See VARTANIAN ET AL., supra note 279, at 27 (“Perhaps the most challenging and mysterious 
questions for investors and their legal advisors . . . is whether a combination of stock ownership, board 
seats, business relationships and other affiliations with a [bank] equates to a ‘controlling 
influence’ . . . .”). 
 282 See id. at 27–31. 
 283 See id. 
 284 See Letter from Randall D. Guynn, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, to Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 15 (July 15, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/ 
2019/July/20190717/R-1662/R-1662_071519_134306_479985787863_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3S3-
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Banks and investors have criticized the Federal Reserve’s ad hoc 
approach to control determinations on two grounds. First, they allege that the 
Federal Reserve’s case-by-case precedent lacks transparency and 
consistency. As Federal Reserve Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal 
Quarles—a proponent of bank deregulation285—has stated, “the practical 
determinants of when one company is deemed to control another are . . . 
ornate . . . and in some cases cannot be discovered except through 
supplication to someone who has spent a long apprenticeship in the art of 
Fed interpretation.”286 Second, critics argue that the Federal Reserve has 
interpreted the BHC Act’s control provisions too stringently, thereby 
discouraging investment.287 Community banks, in particular, have insisted 
that excessively strict control interpretations make it difficult for them to 
raise capital from investors that do not want to become BHCs.288 
The Federal Reserve has responded to these criticisms by codifying its 
approach to control determinations. In early 2020, the Federal Reserve 
adopted a rule to “simplify and increase the transparency” of its control 
precedent.289 The rule establishes presumptions of control and noncontrol, 
 
K4SX]. The Federal Reserve typically required an investor seeking a noncontrol determination to provide 
“passivity commitments” in which the investor would promise not to exercise or attempt to exercise a 
controlling influence over the bank. See VARTANIAN ET AL., supra note 279, at 33–34. 
 285 See, e.g., Jeanna Smialek, Meet the Man Loosening Bank Regulation, One Detail at a Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/29/business/economy/bank-regulations-
fed.html [https://perma.cc/8D3H-XHBB]. 
 286 Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 
Remarks at the American Bar Association Banking Law Committee Annual Meeting: Early Observations 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Post-Crisis Regulation 8 (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/quarles20180119a.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PZ6-
S8PS]; see also Guynn, supra note 284, at 15 (“This lack of transparency has produced both a lack of 
consistency and a lack of certainty.”). 
 287 See, e.g., Letter from Gregg Rozansky, Senior Vice President & Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
Bank Pol’y Inst., to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 8 (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2019/July/20190717/R-1662/R-1662_071519_ 
134305_476700834744_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S7-NZ5X] (“An overbroad view of the ‘controlling 
influence’ standard results in significant adverse consequences for . . . bank holding companies (including 
the ability of financially challenged and smaller banking organizations to raise capital) . . . .”). 
 288 See Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regul. Counsel, Indep. Cmty. 
Bankers of Am., to Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 2–3 (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2019/July/20190717/R-1662/R-1662_071519_134339_ 
527384436530_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B73E-ULTV]; Control and Divestiture Proceedings, 85 Fed. Reg. 
12398, 12400 (Mar. 2, 2020). 
 289 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Finalizes Rule to Simplify 
and Increase the Transparency of the Board’s Rules for Determining Control of a Banking Organization 
(Jan. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Control Press Release], 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200130a.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/3TYN-LL2P]. 
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depending on an investor’s equity ownership, number of board seats, and 
business relationships, among other factors.290 The Federal Reserve has 
explained that the presumptions are “generally consistent with [its] current 
practice” in making ad hoc control determinations.291 By codifying these 
presumptions, the Federal Reserve aims to make it “easier for banks, 
particularly community banks, to raise capital to support lending and 
investment.”292 
Despite the Federal Reserve’s claims, however, the control rule does 
not merely codify existing practice. Instead, the rule goes well beyond the 
Federal Reserve’s precedent and allows private equity funds, hedge funds, 
and other investors to exert significantly more influence over community 
banks without being deemed in control.293 The rule’s most significant 
liberalization allows a noncontrolling investor to appoint more members to 
a bank’s board of directors. Traditionally, the Federal Reserve has limited a 
noncontrolling investor to one—or, in limited circumstances, two—director 
representative.294 By contrast, the new rule allows a noncontrolling investor 
to appoint up to one-quarter of a bank’s board, or three directors for the 
average bank.295 In addition, the new rule relaxes constraints on a 
noncontrolling investor’s representative chairing the bank’s board of 
investors and permits a noncontrolling investor to have more significant 
 
 290 See Control Rule, supra note 275, at 12401–12.  
 291 See id. at 12401. 
 292 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Invites Public 
Comment on Proposal to Simplify and Increase the Transparency of Rules for Determining Control of a 
Banking Organization (Apr. 23, 2019) (quoting Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. 
Powell), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20190423a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H43X-QBHF]. 
 293 Reviewing the new rule, law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz commented that 
“[b]eneficiaries of the rule include . . . private equity” because “it is now possible for an investor to effect 
real change at a bank without being deemed to control it.” Edward D. Herlihy & Richard K. Kim, 
Financial Institution Developments, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/17/financial-institution-developments/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A7AX-ZPK6]. 
 294 See Control and Divestiture Proceedings, 84 Fed. Reg. 21634, 21639 (May 14, 2019) [hereinafter 
Control Proposal]. The Federal Reserve has allowed a noncontrolling investor to have two director 
representatives when: (1) there is another, larger shareholder that controls the bank, and (2) two director 
representatives represent a share of the bank’s board that is proportional to the investor’s voting interest 
in the bank. See id. 
 295 See Control Rule, supra note 275, at 12402–03; see also BANK DIR., 2018 COMPENSATION 
SURVEY 22 (2018), https://www.bankdirector.com/wp-content/uploads/2018_Compensation_Survey.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9HG-F7DQ] (reporting that median board size is twelve members for banks with 
between $1 billion and $5 billion in assets). Further, the rule eliminates the requirement that there be 
another, larger shareholder that controls the bank in order for a noncontrolling investor to have more than 
one director representative. See Control Proposal, supra note 294, at 21639. 
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business relationships with the bank.296 Although Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman Randal Quarles has described these reforms as “a few targeted 
policy adjustments,”297 in practice, they could have a significant destabilizing 
effect on community bank corporate governance. 
Allowing investors—particularly private equity firms and hedge 
funds—to exert more influence over community bank management is likely 
to increase risk-taking among small banks. Private equity firms and hedge 
funds often have higher risk preferences than typical community bank 
investors.298 And because less sophisticated directors often defer to more 
authoritative board members, private equity firm or hedge fund 
representatives could wield outsized influence in community bank 
boardrooms.299 Relaxing limits on noncontrolling investors’ board 
representation will thus likely permit risk-prone institutional investors to 
steer community banks toward riskier strategies. 
This intuition is consistent with empirical evidence that when a private 
equity firm takes an ownership stake in a financial company, the company 
increases its risk profile. As Professor Natasha Sarin and economist Divya 
Kirti have documented, after a private equity firm invests in an insurance 
company, the insurer immediately shifts its bond portfolio toward riskier 
assets.300 Sarin and Kirti show that private equity investors take advantage of 
loopholes in insurance capital rules to increase returns without assuming 
higher capital charges.301 Private equity investors could engage in similar 
 
 296 See Control Rule, supra note 275, at 12403 (discussing director representative service as chair of 
the bank’s board); id. at 12403–05 (establishing guidelines for business relationships). 
 297 See Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 
Opening Statement on Proposal to Revise the Board’s Control Rules (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/quarles-opening-statement-20190423.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8EUT-TP5F]. 
 298 See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 6, at I (“Community banks tend to be . . . 
characterized by local ownership, local control, and local decision making.”); id. at 1-1 (“This means that 
community banks may weigh the competing interests of shareholders, customers, employees, and the 
local community differently from a larger institution with stronger ties to the capital markets.”). 
 299 See Heidi K. Gardner & Randall S. Peterson, Back Channels in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 107, 113 (“Under pressure, groups tend to defer to people of higher status . . . .”). 
 300 See Divya Kirti & Natasha Sarin, Private Equity Value Creation in Finance: Evidence from Life 
Insurance 15–20 (Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law No. 2154, 2020), https://scholarship.law.upenn. 
edu/faculty_scholarship/2154 [https://perma.cc/VQ6N-REPM]. 
 301 See id. at 3 (“Private equity-backed insurance firms are quick to increase asset risk without 
incurring any capital charges by substituting out of highly rated corporate bonds and into poorly rated 
private label asset-backed securities . . . .”). Similarly, Professor Robert DeYoung and colleagues have 
documented a significant jump in risk metrics at publicly traded commercial banks that received private 
equity investments between 2004 and 2016. See Robert DeYoung, Michal Kowalik & Gokhan Torna, 
Private Equity Investment in U.S. Banks (Mar. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://business.depaul.edu/about/centers-institutes/financial-
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behavior with community banks now that they are subject to fewer 
investment constraints. Efforts to weaken the Federal Reserve’s control 
precedent are therefore particularly worrisome when combined with other 
community bank regulatory rollbacks. Private equity firms and hedge funds 
are uniquely apt to recognize new profit opportunities created by the 
community bank leverage ratio, the Volcker Rule exemption, and brokered 
deposit rules.302 Thus, newly empowered institutional investors are precisely 
the parties who are best positioned to exploit emerging weaknesses in 
community bank regulation. 
 
*          *          * 
 
In sum, the EGRRCPA and related deregulatory initiatives threaten to 
undermine community bank safety and soundness in several ways. These 
misguided reforms permit community banks to invest in riskier assets and 
use more volatile funding sources, while removing important supervisory 
oversight and allowing risk-prone investors to influence managerial 
decisions. Thus, if these reforms remain in place, they will enhance the 
probability and severity of another too-many-to-fail crisis. The next Part 
therefore recommends a novel regulatory approach to safeguard the 
community bank sector. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY BANK REGULATION 
This final Part recommends a new framework for community bank 
regulation in light of this Article’s key insight that small banks can propagate 
systemic risk. Section IV.A contends that the overarching weakness of the 
current regulatory architecture is its two-tiered structure, which will increase 
financial instability by making the community bank sector a vehicle for 
regulatory arbitrage. Section IV.B reinforces why, due to those same 
concerns, the recent deregulatory movement should be halted and reversed. 
Finally, Section IV.C urges that, to the extent the current two-tiered system 
remains in place, policymakers should mitigate the destabilizing effects of 
 
services/Documents/DeYoung%20Kowalik%20Torna.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NVY-DAF8]. The 
researchers observe a significant shift in the banks’ asset portfolios toward volatile securities following a 
private equity investment and conclude that “consistent with the historically held concerns of bank 
regulators, private equity investment increased the risk profiles of commercial banking companies.” Id. 
at 24. 
 302 Moreover, since institutional investors generally do not have close ties to a community bank’s 
hometown, they may be less concerned than local community bank shareholders about the negative 
externalities of adopting riskier strategies. 
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regulatory arbitrage through enhanced supervision of community banks. 
Specifically, it argues that two measures—heightened oversight of 
regulatory “cliff effects” and sector-wide community bank stress tests—
would help reduce the risk of another too-many-to-fail crisis. 
A. The Problem of Regulatory Arbitrage 
This Article’s critique of postcrisis community bank regulation turns on 
the potential for regulatory arbitrage in the financial system, which is 
arguably the defining policy problem in all of banking law.303 Regulatory 
arbitrage can be understood as a consequence of the “boundary problem” 
that is inherent in every legal rule.304 By definition, every regulation includes 
a set of explicit or implicit boundaries that delineate the population of firms 
or activities to which it applies.305 These boundaries introduce a challenge for 
financial regulation because, even if a new restriction successfully reduces 
risk-taking by a certain subset of banks in the first instance, it also increases 
the returns from similar forms of financial intermediation conducted outside 
the regulatory perimeter. Thus, the catch-22 that accompanies any financial 
regulation is that the more it proves effective, the more it encourages 
financial activity to flow across legal boundaries from the well-regulated 
sector to the less-regulated sector. 
Although the regulatory arbitrage problem occurs to some degree in 
every area of the law, the dilemmas it presents are particularly acute with 
respect to the banking system due to the unique flexibility of financial 
activity, which can be legally repackaged to cross regulatory boundaries with 
 
 303 See generally Matthew C. Turk, The Convergence of Insurance with Banking and Securities 
Industries, and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in Finance, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 967 (discussing 
regulatory arbitrage in the financial sector). 
 304 See Charles Goodhart, The Boundary Problem in Financial Regulation, 206 NAT’L INST. ECON. 
REV. 48, 48–50 (2008); see also MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ANDREW CROCKET, CHARLES GOODHART, 
AVINASH D. PERSAUD & HYUN SHIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 69 
(2009). 
 305 Most often, these boundaries are explicit. For example, when the financial regulators issued their 
Dodd-Frank risk-retention rules for mortgage-backed securitizations, they exempted loans that are 
designated as “Qualified Residential Mortgages.” See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602 (Dec. 
24, 2014). When the CFPB promulgated its mortgage-underwriting rules in connection with § 1411 of 
Dodd-Frank, known as “Regulation Z,” it included a carve out for “Qualified Mortgages,” defined 
somewhat differently from “Qualified Residential Mortgages.” See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e); Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639); see also 
David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified Mortgage” Tells Us About 
Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 721–24 (2012) (reviewing the development of regulations 
that draw a line between “qualified” and “nonqualifying” home mortgages for purposes of certain 
regulatory exemptions). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
708 
remarkable ease.306 One classic example is an FDIC rule from the 1980s, 
known as Regulation Q, which placed a ceiling on the interest rate that 
commercial banks could offer depositors.307 Soon after that ceiling was 
imposed, money market mutual funds and other entities that did not qualify 
as commercial banks quickly emerged to provide deposit-like services, and 
the now-infamous “shadow banking sector” was born.308 Another dramatic 
illustration is the market for “364-day repo” contracts, which arose following 
changes to the international Basel Accords that attempted to push banks 
toward assets with a maturity of less than one year.309 
These episodes present a cautionary tale for postcrisis reforms, which 
have created a two-tiered system that sorts financial institutions according to 
their size.310 Dodd-Frank’s primary aim was to formulate an elaborate 
constellation of new restrictions for the largest too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions, while leaving the precrisis rules for smaller banks more or less 
intact.311 The EGRRCPA exacerbated this disparity by further relaxing rules 
for community banks.312 A doubly perverse outcome can be anticipated to 
follow: any regulatory boundary premised on a size threshold will expand 
the market share of banks below that threshold, while also making those 
banks less stable. In other words, to the extent that postcrisis rules meet their 
goal of safeguarding a subset of too-big-to-fail institutions, they 
simultaneously drive risk-taking toward smaller banks and thereby make 
another too-many-to-fail crisis more likely. 
Although the most serious consequences of EGRRCPA-induced 
regulatory arbitrage will not be felt until well after the Act’s implementation, 
recent research suggests that financial risk-taking has already begun to 
 
 306 See Thomas W. Merrill, A Comment on Metzger and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, 78 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189–92 (2015) (noting the quicksilver-like flexibility of financial activities with 
respect to regulatory boundaries); Turk, supra note 303, at 1061. 
 307 See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 190, at 53, 251 n.26, 299 n.46 (analyzing Regulation Q and 
its role in the rise of shadow banking). For a general discussion of the implementation and subsequent 
fading out of Regulation Q, see R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It 
Passed Away, 68 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 22 (1986). 
 308 See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 190, at 53–54. 
 309 See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 
Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 18 (Int’l Growth Ctr., Working Paper No. 18, 2011).  
 310 See supra Section II.A. In reality, the postcrisis regulatory landscape is even more gradated, with 
additional levels of regulation kicking in for firms with $250 billion and $700 billion in assets, and for 
those designated as global systemically important banks. See Changes to Applicability Thresholds for 
Regulatory Capital and Liquidity Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 59230, 59231, 59244 (Nov. 1, 2019) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). The most significant and far-reaching boundary problem, 
however, occurs at the $10 billion threshold that separates community banks from noncommunity banks. 
 311 See supra Section II.A. 
 312 See supra Section III. 
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migrate to community banks. For example, one recent econometric study 
concludes that, as a result of Dodd-Frank’s stress tests, the market for 
relatively risky business loans has shifted away from large banks subject to 
the tests and toward community banks, which are not.313 Related research has 
also found that, due to this risk migration, small banks would be unable to 
pass stress tests equivalent to those required of larger banks.314 Significantly, 
this research does not find that small banks would struggle due to the 
compliance costs of administering the stress tests, or suggest that those tests 
have been tailored to large-bank balance sheets and are therefore a poor fit 
for the business model of small banks.315 Rather, the primary factor is that 
community bank asset portfolios have started to absorb riskier loans.316 Thus, 
in keeping with the simple logic of regulatory arbitrage, risks have already 
begun migrating to the community bank sector, with this dynamic likely to 
accelerate once the EGRRCPA’s provisions are fully implemented. 
There is yet another strong indicator that postcrisis reforms have 
encouraged regulatory arbitrage: banks are “bunching”—or strategically 
manipulating their asset sizes—just below regulatory size thresholds.317 The 
starkest bunching effect has occurred just below the $10 billion asset mark 
at which many community bank exemptions phase out. For the 2003 to 2006 
period—when the $10 billion asset threshold had negligible regulatory 
significance—the number of institutions with assets slightly below $10 
billion outnumbered banks with assets slightly above $10 billion by about 
20%.318 But by the 2015 to 2017 period—when Dodd-Frank began shielding 
community banks from certain regulatory burdens—there were more than 
three times as many banks hovering just below the $10 billion threshold as 
 
 313 See Cortés et al., supra note 29, at 30–34; cf. Francisco Covas, Capital Requirements in 
Supervisory Stress Tests and Their Adverse Impact on Small Business Lending 28–30 (The Clearing 
House, Working Paper No. 2017-2, 2017) (demonstrating that the stress test reduces credit availability 
and loan growth). For a discussion of regulatory capital arbitrage, see generally Erik F. Gerding, The 
Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 358 
(2016). 
 314 See Bill Nelson & Francisco Covas, How Would Banks that Concentrate in Main Street Lending 
Fare in the Fed’s CCAR Stress Test?, BANK POL’Y INST. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://bpi.com/how-would-
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 315 See id. 
 316 See id. 
 317 See Mukharlyamov & Sarin, supra note 30, at 25–27 (discussing the bunching phenomenon). 
 318 David Hou & Missaka Warusawitharana, Effects of Fixed Nominal Thresholds for Enhanced 
Supervision, FEDS NOTES (July 19, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-
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there were institutions slightly above it.319 Anecdotal accounts from industry 
participants often attribute this bunching dynamic to the regulatory “pain” 
that banks expect to encounter when crossing key size thresholds, which 
incentivizes them to restrict lending growth for legal-compliance reasons, 
rather than any business or economic rationale.320 Research by financial 
economists also concludes that similar considerations have prevented 
community banks from pursuing otherwise attractive acquisition 
opportunities in order to keep their total assets below $10 billion.321 Banks, 
in sum, are engaging in regulatory arbitrage by clustering below asset 
thresholds that shield them from adverse legal treatment. 
Taken together, this pair of emerging patterns—risk migration and 
institutional bunching—can be visualized as a kind of “cliff effect.” As 
researchers at the Federal Reserve have observed, these regulatory cliff 
effects are triggered by the “discontinuous increase in regulatory burdens as 
[banks] cross the[] fixed nominal asset thresholds” that permeate postcrisis 
reforms.322 Because nominal size thresholds draw an inherently arbitrary 
bright line between institutions on either side, financial activities—and their 
attendant risks—have begun to flow over those regulatory cliffs and cluster 
just short of where heightened legal restrictions kick in. As this Article has 
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number of significant postcrisis rules kick in as well. See id.; see also Christina Rexrode & Ryan Tracy, 
The $50 Billion Question: What Makes a Bank Big?, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2017, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-50-billion-question-what-makes-a-bank-big-1496136650 [https:// 
perma.cc/YH94-GFV9] (discussing the debate over regulatory size thresholds which target banks with 
$50 billion in assets or more).  
 320 See Robert Barba, Crossing the $10B Threshold Is Painful, Acquirers Say, AM. BANKER (Sept. 
17, 2014, 5:27 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/crossing-the-10b-threshold-is-painful-
acquirers-say [https://perma.cc/3SUA-K9PG]; Pain Ahead: Crossing the $10 Billion Threshold, 
STRATEGIC RES. MGMT., https://www.srmcorp.com/pdfs/13/fact_sheet_approaching_10_billion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HC6W-FVA6]; Susan Thomas Springer, What Happens When a Bank Hits $10 
Billion?, INDEP. BANKER (Feb. 27, 2017), https://independentbanker.org/2017/02/what-happens-when-a-
bank-hits-10-billion [https://perma.cc/4LRZ-4DE8]; Patty Tascarella, The $10B Dilemma: As Banks 
Near This Amount in Assets, Many Don’t Want to Cross the Line, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2016/09/21/the-10b-dilemma-as-banks-
near-this-amount.html [https://perma.cc/MH46-GUPW]. 
 321 For banks approaching the $10 billion asset threshold, the average size of mergers and acquisitions 
has increased considerably in recent years. This finding suggests that banks have forgone otherwise 
attractive acquisition opportunities unless the target bank would increase the bank’s size sufficiently to 
justify the increased regulatory costs. See Hailey Ballew, Michael Iselin & Allison Nicoletti, Regulatory 
Asset Thresholds and Acquisition Activity in the Banking Industry 18–28 (June 16, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.communitybanking.org/~/media/files/communitybanking/2017/session2_ 
paper3_nicoletti.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9M8-WRHT]; Allison Nicoletti, Michael Iselin & Hailey 
Ballew, Bright Lines: How Regulatory Asset Thresholds Change the Banking Industry, 6 PENN. 
WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE 1, 4 (2018). 
 322 See Hou & Warusawitharana, supra note 318. 
115:647 (2020) Too Many to Fail 
711 
argued, the $10 billion cutoff used to define community banks and determine 
their regulatory treatment is now the most salient regulatory threshold. 
Thus, a central challenge for community bank regulation going forward 
is to police the distortions created by regulatory arbitrage of the $10 billion 
ceiling. To that end, the next two Sections recommend that policymakers 
address these distortions by: (1) halting and reversing the EGRRCPA and 
related deregulatory initiatives, and (2) closely supervising community 
banks, with an emphasis on those approaching regulatory asset thresholds. 
B. Recommendation #1: Reverse Recent Deregulatory Reforms 
The most straightforward way to mitigate the “cliff effect” dynamics 
outlined above would be to undo the EGGRCPA provisions that provide 
unduly favorable regulatory treatment to community banks. As described in 
Part III, the EGGRCPA and related deregulatory initiatives encourage 
community banks to substantially increase their risk profiles. Therefore, the 
best strategy to prevent the predictable escalation of risk in the community 
bank sector is to repeal the EGGRCPA’s deregulatory provisions. 
To be sure, repealing the EGGRCPA will be politically difficult. As 
discussed above, community banks wield outsized power in Congress.323 
And given the bipartisan support EGGRCPA received, mere shifts in party 
control within Congress will not be sufficient to undo the law.324 In the most 
likely scenario, Congress will not reregulate community banks until too late, 
after the next too-many-to-fail crisis.325 But proactive—rather than 
reactive—legislation would be far preferable to safeguard the community 
bank sector from oncoming risks. 
Even if Congress does not act, however, the federal regulatory agencies 
can address some emerging risks through the administrative rulemaking 
process, which may be more politically feasible. The EGRRCPA, for 
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example, authorizes the federal banking agencies to set the CBLR between 
8% and 10%.326 Although the agencies initially fixed the leverage ratio at 
9%,327 they could increase the leverage requirement to 10% to ensure that 
community banks maintain a bigger capital cushion against potential losses. 
Moreover, the FDIC should refrain from adopting its proposal to loosen 
restrictions on brokered deposits, which is not required by statute.328 And the 
agencies, of course, retain broad discretion to enact other prudential 
safeguards—such as liquidity requirements, risk-management standards, or 
credit-concentration limits—to prevent excessive risk-taking by community 
banks.329 Thus, while legislative repeal of the EGRRCPA would be the 
optimal response to the too-many-to-fail problem, the regulatory agencies 
can address some emerging risks on their own. 
C. Recommendation #2: Strengthen Community Bank Oversight 
Even if the EGRRCPA were reversed in full, the United States’ two-
tiered regulatory structure would nonetheless remain intact—albeit to a 
lesser extent—due to exemptions in Dodd-Frank that shield community 
banks from the most meaningful postcrisis reforms.330 So too would the 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage that are facilitated under such a 
structure. It is therefore imperative that the regulatory architecture 
incorporate some affirmative measures to prevent the arbitrage of size 
thresholds from destabilizing the community bank sector. 
This Section proposes two supervisory reforms that would mitigate the 
risks of such cliff effects, whether or not Congress were to repeal the 
EGRRCPA. In general, the financial regulatory agencies use two oversight 
techniques: firm-specific microprudential supervision and sector-wide 
macroprudential surveillance.331 At the firm-specific level, the financial 
regulatory agencies should enhance microprudential supervision by focusing 
their attention on community banks approaching the $10 billion regulatory 
“cliff.” At the same time, the financial regulatory agencies should implement 
a macroprudential approach to community bank supervision by establishing 
sector-wide stress tests to detect escalating risks among smaller banks. These 
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 328 See supra Section III.B. 
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 330 See supra Section II.A 
 331 See generally David Aikman, Jonathan Bridges, Anil Kashyap & Caspar Siegert, Would 
Macroprudential Regulation Have Prevented the Last Crisis?, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 107 (2019) 
(explaining the distinction between microprudential and macroprudential financial regulation). 
115:647 (2020) Too Many to Fail 
713 
supervisory reforms would work in conjunction to offset the risks of 
regulatory arbitrage that are endemic to the two-tiered legal structure of 
postcrisis financial regulation. 
1. Enhance Supervision of Regulatory “Cliff Effects” 
First, the financial regulatory agencies should use microprudential 
mechanisms to deter the buildup of risk near regulatory “cliffs.” 
Microprudential oversight is the most traditional form of bank supervision, 
involving regular safety-and-soundness examinations of individual firms.332 
Because the EGRRCPA constrains microprudential supervision of certain 
community banks,333 it is increasingly important for the financial regulatory 
agencies to use their remaining supervisory authority to effectively identify 
risks. 
The agencies’ microprudential supervision framework is generally well 
designed to deter regulatory arbitrage. When performing safety-and-
soundness exams, the agencies evaluate individual banks on six metrics that 
comprise the so-called CAMELS rating system: (C)apital, (A)ssets, 
(M)anagement, (E)arnings, (L)iquidity, and (S)ensitivity to market risk.334 
The agencies assign a bank a rating of one to five on each metric—with one 
meaning “strong” and five meaning “critically deficient”—plus an overall 
“composite” score.335 Ratings downgrades can lead to various regulatory 
penalties for a bank, including prohibitions on mergers and acquisitions, 
restrictions on activities, and limitations on opening new branches.336 As a 
result, banks try to maintain strong CAMELS ratings. 
In response to the EGRRCPA’s ill-advised regulatory rollbacks, the 
banking agencies should use their microprudential supervisory authority to 
deter firms from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. Safety-and-soundness 
examinations have always been understood as an open-ended, qualitative 
process, and regulators wield ample legal authority to address those 
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concerns.337 For example, the agencies could use the “Assets” and 
“Liquidity” criteria to focus on the migration of relatively high-risk loans or 
funding sources across the regulatory cliff that separates community banks 
from mid-sized institutions. Likewise, the agencies could broaden the 
“Sensitivity” criterion to account for a wider range of market risks, especially 
to the extent that firms close to the $10 billion cliff increase their risk 
tolerance in light of their exemption from the Volcker Rule.338 Downgrading 
banks that escalate their risk profiles in response to the EGRRCPA would at 
least somewhat offset the regulatory arbitrage problem. Moreover, these 
supervisory reforms focused on regulatory cliff effects would be largely 
consistent with the agencies’ traditional microprudential practice. 
Thus, notwithstanding the EGGRCPA’s regulatory rollbacks, the 
agencies can help mitigate risks in the community bank sector by 
emphasizing microprudential supervision of banks approaching regulatory 
cliffs. While Congress undid many important safeguards, the agencies retain 
discretion to penalize excessively risky banks through the supervisory 
process. Enhancing microprudential supervision of firms near regulatory 
cliffs may therefore be the agencies’ most flexible response to the regulatory 
arbitrage problem. 
2. Stress Test the Community Bank Sector 
Macroprudential supervision of community banks should be a critical 
supplement to traditional safety-and-soundness examinations at individual 
institutions.339 The real threat to financial stability is not that any particular 
small bank might attempt to manipulate postcrisis regulatory size thresholds. 
Rather, it is the possibility for a wholesale leakage of financial risk-taking 
across the $10 billion boundary, which in turn could imperil numerous 
community banks at the same time. Since the 2008 financial crisis, 
macroprudential supervision has focused exclusively on “too-big-to-fail” 
banks.340 In light of the regulatory-arbitrage phenomenon, however, the 
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federal banking agencies should use their existing legal authorities to 
conduct macroprudential supervision of the community bank sector as well. 
While bank supervision has traditionally focused on microprudential 
strategies, postcrisis reforms introduced a macroprudential approach for the 
largest financial institutions. For example, Dodd-Frank centralized macro-
surveillance of the financial sector in the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC), an umbrella agency designed to coordinate the monitoring 
of systemic risk.341 Moreover, Dodd-Frank established annual Federal 
Reserve stress tests for the largest bank holding companies, designed to 
detect the largest banks’ systemic vulnerabilities to macroeconomic and 
financial shocks.342 To date, however, this macroprudential approach to bank 
supervision has overlooked potential systemic risks among community 
banks. 
Thus, as a natural extension of postcrisis macroprudential supervision, 
the FSOC and the federal banking agencies should assess whether the cliff 
effects introduced by postcrisis policy changes are accelerating in a way that 
undermines the stability of the community bank sector as a whole. As a 
starting point, the banking agencies could analyze aggregate data drawn from 
Call Reports submitted by individual community banks, with an eye toward 
spotting industry-wide trends that reflect arbitrage of the $10 billion size 
boundary. More ambitiously, the banking agencies could use the same data 
to perform nonbinding stress tests of the small banking sector to evaluate 
whether community banks in general are resilient to adverse macroeconomic 
conditions or shocks to other parts of the financial system.343 While small 
banks are exempt from Dodd-Frank’s firm-specific stress tests, sector-wide 
stress tests would enable the banking agencies to monitor aggregate risks 
among community banks. The results of such sector-wide stress tests could 
then inform the agencies’ microprudential supervisory priorities. 
In short, while macroprudential supervision is typically thought of as a 
response to the too-big-to-fail problem, it can also help alleviate the too-
many-to-fail issue. FSOC and the banking agencies should respond to 
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escalating systemic risks among community banks by monitoring aggregate 
exposures, including through sector-wide stress tests. This macroprudential 
approach would be appropriate in light of community banks’ 
underappreciated systemic importance. 
CONCLUSION 
The too-many-to-fail phenomenon is the most persistent and 
underappreciated pattern in U.S. banking history. It is not difficult, therefore, 
to envision the next community bank crisis on the horizon. Both historical 
experience and basic economic theory teach that the too-many-to-fail 
phenomenon is likely to recur and should thus be an ongoing, central focus 
of U.S. financial regulation. Despite this intuition, however, policymakers 
suffering from collective amnesia have implemented policies that make the 
next too-many-to-fail crisis more likely. Financial regulatory scholars, 
meanwhile, have unwisely welcomed these reforms. 
This Article has demonstrated that the conceptual justifications for 
community bank deregulation are deeply flawed. Contrary to popular 
perception, the community bank sector is often systemically important. 
Moreover, postcrisis regulatory reforms did not excessively burden 
community banks, and community banks can continue to fulfill their 
relational-lending niche without special subsidies or deregulation. 
This Article has attempted to expose these long-held myths, perpetuated 
by the community-bank lobby and its allies. The Article has argued that the 
EGRRCPA and related regulatory rollbacks unwisely increase risks in the 
community bank sector and encourage regulatory arbitrage. And it has 
proposed a comprehensive framework to safeguard community banks in the 
future. At the very least, this Article aimed to change the deeply flawed 
conventional wisdom about community banks. With a proper understanding 
of community banks’ potential systemic risks, policymakers should take the 
necessary steps to address the too-many-to-fail problem. 
